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TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT, TRADEMARK DILUTION,
AND THE DECLINE IN SHARING OF FAMOUS BRAND NAMES:
AN INTRODUCTION AND EMPIRICAL STUDY
ROBERT BRAUNEIS *
PAUL HEALD **
Many famous brand names have historically been shared among dozens
or even hundreds of different companies. 1 Courts and commentators often cite
well-known examples of sharing like Delta Airlines and Delta Faucets, 2 or
United Airlines and United Van Lines, 3 but the list of companies sharing these
brand names and many others is much, much longer. Trademark infringement
law has traditionally accommodated brand-name sharing through doctrines that
limit protection to closely related goods and to actual trading areas. 4 Modern
developments in infringement law, however, have challenged those doctrines, 5
and trademark dilution legislation is arguably based on the theory that some
brand names are harmed by, and should be protected against, any sharing at
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1
We do not intend the terms “share” and “sharing,” as we use them in this Article, to
imply that one user of a brand name has granted permission to another, or that there is
any agreement between multiple users of a brand name about their concurrent use. We
are aware that “share” sometimes connotes permission or agreement, or even altruistic
motivation, which is why, for example, the use of the phrase “file sharing” to describe
peer-to-peer Internet distribution has been so contentious. We have not, however,
found better terms to refer to multiple concurrent uses of a single brand name, and
students of trademark law will recognize that the phrase “concurrent use” would be
confusing because it has gained a particular meaning in the Lanham Act in connection
with concurrent registrations. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1052(d), 1067(a).
2
See, e.g., General Motors Corp. v. Autovation Technologies, 317 F. Supp. 2d 756, 761
(E.D. Mich. 2004)
3
See, e.g., Intermatic Inc v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227, 1233 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
4
See infra TAN 9-10.
5
See infra TAN xx –xx.
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all. 6 While some cheer this increased protection, 7 others fear that it will make
brand-name sharing more difficult, and will thereby reduce the stock of brand
names available to businesses. 8 Despite the long-running controversy,
however, to our knowledge no one has attempted to construct a framework for
analyzing brand-name sharing or to conduct empirical studies to determine
whether broader trademark protection has actually affected rates of brand-name
sharing.
This article provides an introduction to the study of brand-name
sharing, and presents results from an empirical study of sharing rates among
131 famous brand names from 1940 through 2010, conducted through an
examination of business names in the white pages telephone directories of
Chicago, Philadelphia, and Manhattan. Perhaps the most dramatic finding of
the study is that independent uses of the 131 brand names – that is, uses of
those names by businesses other than those that made the names famous – have
declined from 3000 to 1380 between 1960 and 2010, a 54% drop. The article
then assesses potential causes for that decline. We evaluate five potential nonlegal factors, including economic changes, family migration, decreased
attractiveness of particular famous brands, changes in the popularity of business
name types, and changes in cultural naming patterns. It then considers
evidence that changes in trademark infringement and dilution law underlie
some part of the decline. The article concludes that both legal and non-legal
factors have likely played a role.
6

See infra TAN xx-xx.
See, e.g., Joshua Jones, The “Inequities” of Dilution: How the Federal Judiciary May
Use Principles of Equity to Frustrate the Intent of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act,
91 J. PAT. TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 200, 2002 (2009) (“The judicial response to this
sudden infusion of dilution into state trademark jurisprudence was tepid at best.”);
Shahar J. Dilbary, Famous Trademarks and the Rational Basis for Protecting
“Irrational Beliefs,” 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 605 (2007); Tara D. Rose, The High
Price of Fame Deserves a Discount: A Call for Uniform Dilution Law in North
America for the Protection of Well Known Trademarks, 14 SW. J. OF L. & TRADE IN
AM. 195, 197 (2007) (“Protection from trademark dilution is an important international
concern requiring uniform protection. Uniform protection will create an incentive for
manufacturers to produce quality products, resulting in accurate reputations on which
the public can depend.”); RUDOLF CALLMANN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION AND
TRADEMARKS 1643 (2d ed. 1950) (“Dilution is an infection, which, if allowed to
spread, will inevitably destroy the value of a mark altogether.”).
8
See, e.g., Laura R. Bradford, Emotion, Dilution, and the Trademark Consumer, 23
BERKELEY J. L. & TECH. 1227, 1230 (2008) (“overly strict protection of mark
familiarity through the law of trademark dilution can burden competitors who signal
product quality and reliability”); Jesse A. Hofrichter, Tool of the Trademark: Brand
Criticism and Free Speech Problems with the Federal Trademark Dilution Revision Act
of 2006, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1923, 1926 (2007) (dilution law “may prove ineffective
in application, and how [ ] will not adequately shield all protected speech from threats
of litigation, resulting in a “chilling effect” on speech.”); Julie Zando-Dennis, Not
Playing Around: The Chilling Power of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995,
11 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L. J. 599, 602 (“the Supreme Court should declare the FTDA
unconstitutional”).
7
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Part I of the Article reviews the history of brand-name sharing and of
the legal doctrines that address it. Part II introduces the empirical study and
explains its design. Since this study is unique, we provide a detailed
justification for our methodology. Part III summarizes the results of the study,
including totals and breakdowns by type of brand name, city, and year. Part IV
considers potential non-legal causes of the decline in brand-name sharing rates.
Part V assesses the argument that increased trademark infringement protection,
and the introduction of dilution protection, were among the causes of the
decline. Part VI concludes that any evaluation of extant law or proposal for
future reform must account for the sharing phenomenon we describe. The
complete database generated by the study, as well as all spreadsheets used to
analyze the data, database documentation, and coding rules, are available
online. 9
I. AN INTRODUCTION TO BRAND-NAME SHARING AND ITS LEGAL TREATMENT
Trademark lawyers may dream of a world in which each separate
source of goods or services is identified by a unique brand name, but the
sharing of brand names was ubiquitous well before Congress ever passed a
federal trademark law. Numerous business proprietors who shared a family
name had affixed that name to their goods and services, and thus in a single city
like Philadelphia one can find unrelated businesses operating under such names
as Baker Chocolate and Cocoa, Baker Beauty Shop, Baker Clothes, Baker
Funeral Home, and Baker Pickling Company. Scores of others who lived in the
same area had affixed to their businesses the name of their city, their river, their
mountain, or their street. In the Chicago neighborhood of Rogers Park, for
example, businesses operate under such names as the Rogers Park Auto Body
Shop, Rogers Park Coiffures, Rogers Park Fine Wines and Spirit, Rogers Park
Insurance Group, and Rogers Park Locksmith. Yet others had adopted names
that they hoped would convey reliability, innovation, status, thrift, or other
desirable qualities. The American Ever Ready Company decided that
“Eveready” was a good brand name for its products – in its case, flashlights and
batteries -- but it was joined by many other companies: in the 1960 New York
telephone book alone, fourteen businesses bore that name, including Eveready
Delivery Service Inc., Eveready Match Co., Eveready Sewing Machine Co.,
and Eveready Television Service.
The judges and legislators who crafted trademark policy had to
recognize the reality that names such as “Baker,” Rogers Park,” and
“Eveready,” though shared, were still serving as brand names, and could not be
denied trademark protection altogether. They therefore crafted a series of
doctrines that accommodated widespread sharing. The doctrine that protection
for a trademark extended only to its area of geographical use enabled many

9
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local businesses situated in different areas to share the same brand name. 10
And the doctrine that a trademark was only protected against use on goods and
services of the same type enabled even those businesses whose geographical
markets overlapped to share the same brand name, so long as they specialized
in different fields of manufacture or trade. 11
Although these doctrines were probably fashioned to accommodate a
pre-existing reality rather than to promote an ideal, in time brand name sharing
was recognized to have certain virtues. There is not an infinite stock of equally
memorable, mellifluous, evocative, and fashionable brand names, 12 and thus
arrangements that allow many businesses to share one brand name promote
more efficient and equitable use of a scarce resource. 13 Indeed, the sharing of a
brand name may contribute to its memorability, since completely unfamiliar
names may be more difficult to remember. 14 In addition, there may be some
10

See Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403 (1916) (first user of mark
does not gain priority in remote area); United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248
U.S. 90 (1918) (same);
11
See Act of February 20, 1905, § 5, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 85 (denying registration to
marks that are identical or similar to registered or known marks “appropriated to
merchandise of the same descriptive properties”); Consumers Petroleum Co. v.
Consumers Co. of Ill., 169 F.2d 153 (7th Cir,. 1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 902 (1949)
(applying the 1905 Act rule)
12
Just one of many constraints, for example, is that it is demonstrably easier to
remember words that are meaningful than those that are not, and there is a limited stock
of meaningful words. See Kim Robertson, Strategically Desirable Brand Name
Characteristics, 1 J. OF PRODUCT AND BRAND MANAGEMENT 62, 64-65 (1992);
Rabindra N. Kanungo, Brand Awareness: Effects of Fittingness, Meaningfulness, and
Product Utility, 52 J. APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 290, 294 (1968).
13
The broader principle that good brand names are a scarce resource has been
recognized on many occasions throughout the history of U.S. trademark law. For
example, the elimination of the “token use” doctrine and the shortening of the
registration renewal period in the Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988 were justified
as measures to remove the amount of “deadwood” on the federal register, a “serious
problem” because “[u]nused marks on the trademark register prevent others wishing to
use those marks from doing so.” Report of the House Judiciary Committee on H.R.
5372, 101-1028 (1988), p. 11. For academic recognition of this principle, see Stephen
Carter, The Trouble with Trademarks, 99 YALE L. J. 759, 759 (1990). (“The traditional
economic justification for trademark law rests on the premise that the set of available
marks is virtually infinite and, in consequence, that the actual mark chosen by a firm to
represent its goods is irrelevant. If that assumption turns out to be false—if even before
the public comes to associate a mark with any particular goods or services, some marks
are more desirable than others—then allowing protection of marks devoid of market
significance may raise substantial barriers to entry by competitors.”)
14
Experiments have shown that in some contexts, a somewhat less common name such
as “Felix” is easier to remember than a more common name such as “John.” See Nicola
Stanhope & Gillian Cohen, Retrieval of Proper Names: Testing the Models, 84 BRITISH
J. OF PSYCHOLOGY 51, 64 (1993). However, we believe it intuitively to be true that
completely unfamiliar foreign names are more difficult to remember upon first
exposure. Readers whose only native language is English can ask themselves whether
they find it more difficult to remember the name of a new acquaintance when it is say, a
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value in not placing the meanings and associations connected with a word
under the dominant control of a single commercial entity. 15
In the second half of the twentieth century, however, the practice of
brand name sharing has faced increasing challenges. First, under U.S. law,
trademark rights are no longer always limited to the geographic area of actual
use. Section 22 of the Lanham Act, passed in 1946, provided for the first time
that a registration on the Principal Register would provide constructive
nationwide notice of the registrant’s claim of ownership in a mark. 16 Courts
held that such notice eliminated the good faith that another user would need to
establish or expand an exclusive right to use the mark on similar goods or
services. 17 The result was that the first user to register the mark obtained the
right to expand its use of the mark to every region of the United States that
other users were not already operating. The first registrant thus had the power
after expansion to limit others who were using the mark before the registration
date to their historical trading area, 18 and to prevent those who commenced use
after the date of registration from using the mark at all. 19
At the same time, the Lanham Act extended these advantages of
registration to many marks that had previously been excluded from registration
under the Trademark Act of 1905. Perhaps most significantly, the 1905 Act
had excluded from registration marks that consisted “merely in the name of an
individual, firm, corporation or association . . . or merely in words . . . which
are descriptive of the goods with which they are used . . . or merely a
geographical name or term.” 20 By contrast, the Lanham Act allows inherently
Chinese name like Xiaoguang or Yangyue, a Hindu name like Anirudh or Sharmila, or
a Thai name like Adirake or Malivalaya.
15
See New Kids on the Block v. News America Publishing, Inc., 971 F.2d 302 (9th Cir.
1992) (putting “New Kids” mark under the complete control of the boy band would
have deleterious economic consequences).
16
Trademark Act of 1946, P.L. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427, § 22. The Federal Trademark
Law Revision Act of 1988 confirmed and strengthened the nationwide rights granted by
federal registration, by providing explicitly that “filing of the application to register [a]
mark shall constitute constructive use of the mark, conferring a right of priority,
nationwide in effect, on or in connection with the goods specified in the registration,”
subject to a number of exceptions. Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, Pub.L. 100667, 102 Stat. 3935 (effective Nov. 16, 1989), codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1057(c).
17
See, e.g., Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart’s Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 362 (2d Cir.
1959); In re Beatrice Foods Co., 429 F.2d 466, 472 (C.C.P.A. 1970) ; Action
Temporary Services, Inc. v. Labor Force, Inc., 870 F.2d 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
18
See, e.g., Burger King of Florida, Inc. v. Hoots, 403 F.2d 904 (7th Cir. 1968).
19
At least as soon as a senior registered user wants to expand into the geographic area
of the junior user, it can obtain an injunction to force the junior user to cease use of the
mark, a threat that would likely lead many junior users to change their brand names
even before they were ordered to. See Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart’s Food Stores, Inc., 267
F.2d 358, 362 (2d Cir. 1959). Moreover, more recent precedent has questioned whether
the senior registered user need demonstrate use in the same geographical area before
obtaining an injunction. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Carmax, Inc., 165 F.3d 1047 (6th
Cir. 1999).
20
Act of February 20, 1905, 33 Stat. 724, § 5.
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distinctive firm names to be registered immediately, and individual names,
descriptive words, and geographical terms to be registered upon proof of
acquired distinctiveness, so long as they are not deceptive. 21
Secondly, as many commentators have detailed, the scope of
infringement protection has increased substantially, from protection only
against goods and services essentially identical to those with which the
plaintiff’s use is connected, to protection against goods and services that are
much more distantly related. 22
This expanded scope of protection along both geographic and subjectmatter dimensions may be traceable in part to changes in judicial and legislative
attitudes, including attitudes about whether granting broad trademark protection
fosters monopolies. Yet changes in commercial realities have also played a role
in the expansion. For example, because very small businesses can now offer
goods for sale nationwide and globally on the Internet, small no longer
necessarily means local. At the same time, as large conglomerates have
become more common, consumers have become used to seeing a single
corporate name in connection with a wide variety of products. And although
umbrella branding of disparate goods has sometimes been an incidental result
of corporate growth, it has also increasingly been the result of intentional
branding strategies. Companies that have decided to build a brand around a
lifestyle – Virgin, Calvin Klein, and Harley Davidson come to mind – market a
wide variety of goods and services under a single brand name.
At least in theory, however, the most radical challenge to brand name
sharing has come from the passage of state and federal trademark dilution
statutes. Although the exact rationale for protection against trademark dilution
is much debated, 23 proponents of such protection contend that there is value in
concentrating all rights to use and control a brand name in a single business,
regardless of whether other businesses would use that name on similar goods or
services, or whether multiple independent uses would be likely to cause
confusion among consumers. 24 In 1947, shortly after an attempt to include a
federal anti-dilution provision in the Lanham Act failed, states began to pass
anti-dilution statutes, and there are now 38 states that have such statutes. 25 In
1995, Congress passed the Federal Trademark Dilution Act, which became
21

See Trademark Act of 1946, §2(f).
See, e.g., Gerard Magliocca, One and Inseparable: Dilution and Infringement in
Trademark Law, 85 MINN. L. REV. 949, 994-1006 (2001) (arguing that the likelihood of
confusion broadened substantially by the 1960s, rendering state dilution statutes
redundant and obsolete); Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark
Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1839, 1913-14 (2007). The Lanham expressly provides
protection against confusion as to “association, sponsorship or approval” in 35 U.S.C. §
1125(a).
23
See DAVID F. WELKOWITZ, TRADEMARK DILUTION: FEDERAL, STATE, AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2002).
24
See supra note ___.
25
See Caroline Chicoine & Jennifer Visintine, The Role of State Trademark Dilution
Statutes in Light of the Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, 96 TRADEMARK
RPTR. 1195, 1195 (2006).
22
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effective the following year. 26 Unlike previous trademark law, these statutes
contemplate that some brand names will be protected against any sharing at all.
The state and federal anti-dilution laws, however, clearly do not
contemplate granting absolute protection against sharing to all brand names.
Rather, they offer that protection only to brand names which meet certain
standards. Chief among those is the requirement of fame: the use of the brand
name by the business seeking protection must be well-known. Since 2006,
federal law has required that a brand name be “widely recognized by the
general consuming public of the United States as a designation of source of the
goods or services of the mark’s owner.” 27 Although federal law does not
further specify what “widely recognized” means, Professor J. Thomas
McCarthy has offered his opinion that “a minimum threshold survey response
should be in the range of 75% of the general consuming public of the United
States.” 28 That is a very high standard, which will be met by a very low
percentage of brand name users. Twenty-four of the 38 state anti-dilution laws
currently in force, especially those modeled after the 1992 and 1996 Model
State Trademark Bill, require that a brand name use be “famous in this state.” 29
That standard would seem to be best interpreted as similar to the current federal
standard, but applied to the consuming public of a particular state rather than all
50 of the United States. Three states have enacted a version of the 2007 Model
State Trademark Bill, which changed the definition of “famous” to “widely
recognized by the general consuming public of [the] state or a geographic area
within [the] state.” 30 That definition even more closely follows federal law in
its insistence on wide recognition by the general consuming public, but opens
up the possibility that the geographic focus might be on a portion of the state
rather than the state as a whole. Finally, 11 states currently have anti-dilution
statutes that draw language from the 1964 Model State Trademark Bill, which
did not explicitly require fame, but authorized injunctive relief against the
“likelihood of dilution” of the “distinctive quality” of a mark. 31 Although
interpretation of this language is not uniform, it is clear that the fame of a mark
is an important factor in determining whether the mark has a “distinctive
quality” that could be subject to dilution. 32
While the fame of a brand name is quite well established as a necessary
condition of blanket protection against brand name sharing, it also seems clear
from the statutes and cases that it is not a sufficient condition. It is almost
certain, for example, that the general consuming public of the United States
26

See Federal Trademark Dilution Act, P.L. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985 (1995).
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A).
28
4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
§ 24:106 (4th ed.).
29
See DAVID S. WELKOWITZ, TRADEMARK DILUTION 2009 CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT,
Table 1-1 (State-by-State Comparison of Dilution Statutes) (2009).
30
See id.
31
See id.
32
See WELKOWITZ, supra note ___, at 32-40 (discussing interpretation of statutes
modeled on the 1964 Trademark Bill).
27
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would recognize as famous brand names like “American” and “United” for
airline transportation; yet it is also virtually certain that the owners of those
marks could not obtain protection against dilution. 33 Exactly why they could
not, and whether additional conditions are properly framed as requirements for
eligibility or as factors in proving dilution, has been a matter of contention. As
we will detail below, it does seem clear that two additional factors play a large
role in determining whether relief will be granted: the extent to which a brand
name is already shared among many users – often referred to as the extent of
“third-party use” in the context of litigation between two users– and the degree
of distinctiveness of the brand name, along the traditional spectrum from
generic to coined. “American” and “United” do not fare well with either of
these two factors. They are shared by many other businesses, and as applied to
airline services, the names do not seem to be particularly distinctive:
“American” seems to be descriptive of airline transportation that is based and
largely provided in America, and “United” suggests that a number of
independent service providers may have been consolidated. Yet, it is not clear
exactly how and why these facts should be taken into account.
Consider, first, the degree of existing sharing, or third-party use. The
Federal Trademark Dilution Act originally treated third-party use as a factor in
determining whether a mark was famous, and therefore entitled to dilution
protection at all. 34 The Trademark Dilution Reform Act eliminated third-party
use as an explicit factor in determining fame, but at the same time it added
third-party use as an explicit factor in determining whether the defendant’s use
was likely to cause dilution by blurring of the plaintiff’s famous mark. 35
Meanwhile, courts that have applied state dilution statutes under which dilution
is defined as a loss of “distinctive quality” have found that third-party uses
make a mark less distinctive or weaker. For example, in the 1980 case of
Amstar Corp. Inc. v. Domino’s Pizza, Inc., 36 the Fifth Circuit, applying Georgia
law, considered whether the defendant’s use of the mark “Domino” for pizza
diluted the plaintiff’s use of the same mark for sugar. It noted that the trial
court record contained evidence of 72 third-party federal registrations for
“Domino,” and further evidence of 15 third-party uses of the mark from 1885 to
the present. 37 The court held that the plaintiff had no claim against the
defendant under Georgia’s anti-dilution statute because “‘Domino,’ outside of
33

See, e.g., Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 216 (2d Cir. 1999)
(remarking that not all famous marks exhibit the distinctiveness required for dilution
protection, and citing “American, National, Federal, Federated, First, United, Acme,
Merit, [and] Ace” as examples).
34
See P.L. 104-98, §3, 109 Stat. 985, 985 (1995), codified at 15 U.S.C. §1125(c)(1)(G)
(1996) (directing courts to consider, in determining whether a mark is distinctive and
famous, “the nature and extent of use of the same or similar marks by third parties.”
35
See P.L. 109-312, §2, 120 Stat. 1729, 1731 (2006), codified at 15 U.S.C.
§1125(c)(2)(B)(iii) (2006) (directing courts to consider, among other factors, “[t]he
extent to which the owner of the famous mark is engaged in substantially exclusive use
of the mark”).
36
615 F.2d 252 (5th Cir. 1980).
37
Id. at 259.
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plaintiff’s line of sugars and portion-control items, has already become a weak
mark.” 38 The Court of Appeals of New York, interpreting the similarly worded
New York dilution statute, considered the degree of third-party use as relevant
to whether the plaintiff’s use had gained secondary meaning, although it seems
that the court was treating “secondary meaning” as akin to fame among the
general public:
A quick glance at the New York City phone directories will
reveal the existence of at least 300 business entities in the
metropolitan area incorporating the word “allied” in their trade
name. In light of the large number of business entities using the
generic term allied in their trade name, it cannot be said that the
name “allied” has acquired a secondary meaning. We remain
unconvinced that the public associates the word “allied” with
the plaintiff's cleaning and maintenance service. 39
Perhaps the relevance of third-party use can be explained in terms of
psychological theories of dilution under which dilution is a particular
phenomenon that occurs in the minds of consumers. 40 Yet it is also possible
that legislators and courts are reacting to more disparate equitable factors. If
the plaintiff adopted a brand name that was already in common use at the time
of adoption, then it may seem that the plaintiff was not particularly concerned
about the uniqueness of its brand name, and it should have to live with its

38

Id. at 265; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25, comment e
(noting that “a trademark is sufficiently distinctive to be diluted by a nonconfusing use
[only] if the mark retains its source significance when encountered outside of the
context of the goods or services with which the mark is used by the trademark owner,”
and that “[c]oncurrent use by others makes it unlikely that consumers will form a single
mental association between the mark and one specific user.”).
39
Allied Maintenance Corp. v. Allied Mechanical Trades, Inc., 42 N.Y.2d 538, 545546, 369 N.E.2d 628, 633 (1977).
40
For example, consumers may make associations between trademarks and certain
types of products, such as an association between “Heineken” and “beer”; on one
theory, dilution is the weakening of those associations. See Sara Stadler Nelson, The
Wages of Ubiquity in Trademark Law, 88 IOWA L. REV. 71 (2003); Maureen Morrin &
Jacob Jacoby, Trademark Dilution: Empirical Measures for an Elusive Concept, 19 J.
PUB. POL'Y & MARKETING 265 (2000). Or maybe consumers make associations
between trademarks and certain desirata such as sportiness or luxury or tradition, and
dilution is the weakening of those associations. See Shahar J. Dilbary, FAMOUS
TRADEMARKS AND THE RATIONAL BASIS FOR PROTECTING “IRRATIONAL BELIEFS,” 14
GEO. MASON L. REV. 605 (2007). Or perhaps consumers become familiar and
comfortable with whatever associations they make with particular marks, and dilution is
the weakening of this comfort. See Laura Bradford, Emotion, Dilution, and the
Trademark Consumer, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1227 (2008). Although they differ,
these theories all seek to reduce dilution to one particular type of phenomenon in the
mind of the consumer, and contend that dilution occurs if and only if that phenomenon
occurs, which is why we dub them “psychological theories.”
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decision. 41 If three hundred other businesses have chosen to adopt a particular
brand name, then it may seem unfair not to let the three-hundred-and-first
business do the same.
The same is true of the issue of distinctiveness. In the narrow sense of
the placement of the mark along the generic-fanciful continuum, distinctiveness
has always been treated as relevant, but exactly how and why has varied. The
original Federal Trademark Dilution Act granted protection to marks that were
“distinctive and famous.” 42 The Second Circuit, parting with some other
circuits, 43 interpreted that language to mean that distinctiveness was a
requirement for protection separate from fame, 44 and later held that only marks
which were inherently distinctive could claim protection under the Federal
Trademark Dilution Act. 45 The Trademark Dilution Reform Act then made it
clear that protection was not limited to inherently distinctive marks, 46 but at the
same time it made clear that the degree of inherent distinctiveness – and of
acquired distinctiveness – was a factor relevant to determining whether dilution
had occurred. 47
Here, too, one could attempt to explain the relevance of this factor in
terms of a psychological theory of dilution, or one could understand it as an
expression of more diverse judgments regarding efficiency and equity. If a
company invests resources in coining a new word to serve as a brand name, and
thereby avoids depleting the finite stock of existing words, then perhaps we
should be less hesitant to protect it against sharing, whether or not such sharing
is particularly likely to cause dilution by blurring. And if another company
chooses to adopt that coined word as a brand name, it is more likely that it did
so with the intention of taking advantage of some of the luster with which the
first company imbued that name, and for those who think that the luster should
belong to its creator, denying use of the name to the second adopter seems the
fair result.
To complicate matters, the factors of fame, third-party use and
distinctiveness are invariably listed by courts as factors in determining the
41

Cf. Sunbeam Lighting Corp. v. Sunbeam Corp., 183 F.2d 969 (9th Cir. 1950) (“If, in
course of our free enterprise, someone would market an unworthy article outside
plaintiff's field bearing the name Sunbeam it must be borne as not an unlikely
circumstance following plaintiff's selection of a non-fanciful word popular with
commercial concerns.”).
42
See P.L. 104-98, §3, 109 Stat. 985, 985 (1995), codified at 15 U.S.C. §1125(c)(1)
(1996)
43
See Times Mirror Magazines, Inc. v. Las Vegas Sports News, LLC, 212 F.3d 157,
167 (3d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1071 (2001).
44
See Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 215-16 (2d Cir. 1999).
45
See TCPIP Holding Co. v. Haar Communications, Inc., 244 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2001).
46
See P.L. 109-312, §2, 120 Stat. 1729, 1731 (2006), codified at 15 U.S.C. §1125(c)(1)
(extending protection against dilution to “the owner of a famous mark that is
distinctive, inherently or through acquired distinctiveness”).
47
See id., codified at 15 U.S.C. §1125(c)(1)(B)(ii) (listing, among factors relevant to
whether a plaintiff’s mark was subject to dilution by blurring, “The degree of inherent
or acquired distinctiveness of the famous mark”).
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likelihood of confusion, and thus also play a large role in determining the scope
of trademark infringement protection. 48 If an arbitrary or fanciful brand name
is famous, and there are few other users, a court is likely to grant infringement
protection to the famous user against more distant lines of business. 49 Thus,
from a functional point of view one could see dilution protection simply as an
extension of infringement protection.
Under infringement law, fame,
distinctiveness, and thinness of third-party use all increase the subject-matter
scope of protection. Dilution simply adds a categorical threshold: at some
point, a level of fame, distinctiveness and rarity is reached at which no other
user can share the brand name. If that threshold is set low, then the
introduction of dilution protection will have a substantial effect on brand name
sharing; but if it is set high, the introduction of dilution protection will have a
less noticeable effect.
II.

48

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE EMPIRICAL PROJECT

As every trademark law student soon learns, each circuit has its own list of factors to
consider in determining whether there is a likelihood of confusion between two marks,
but they invariably include both third-party use and distinctiveness, sometimes
considered together as the factor of the “strength” of the mark. See, e.g., Polaroid Corp.
v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961) (factors include “the strength
of the mark”); AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1979) (factors
include “the strength of the mark”); In re E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 476 F.2d
1357 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (factors include “the number and nature of similar marks in use
on similar goods”);
49
To be sure, in the trademark infringement context, courts often state that they
consider third-party uses on similar goods and services much more relevant than such
uses on dissimiliar goods and services. See, e.g., Morningside Group Ltd. v.
Morningside Capital Group, L.L.C., 182 F.3d 133, 139 (2d Cir. 1999) (“Use of a like
mark in a different market for different products or services need not undermine the
mark’s strength in its own market”); Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Century Life of
America, 970 F.2d 874, 877-878 (Fed. Cir. 1992). Some courts have even stated that
third-party uses on dissimilar goods and services are completely irrelevant to the issue
of infringement, such that evidence of such uses is properly excluded. See Eclipse
Associates Ltd. v. Data General Corp., 894 F.2d 1114, 1119 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding
that it was not error to exclude evidence of use of the plaintiff’s mark “Eclipse” in
fields unrelated to computers, such as floor cleaning products, commercial laundry
folding equipment, and industrial process heating equipment).
The focus on uses on similar goods and services potentially distinguishes the
inquiry into third-party uses in infringement cases from that in dilution cases.
However, when the issue is how broadly a mark is protected against merely marginally
similar uses, the number of third-party uses even on dissimilar goods should be
relevant. See 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS 11:88 (4th ed.)
(“some evidence of unrelated use is necessary where the alleged mark is in widespread
use in many fields, such as ACME, NATIONAL or PREMIUM. That is, evidence of
extensive third party use on a wide range of goods and services does tend to weaken
strength and narrow the scope of protection.”)
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A.
The Dearth and Potential Relevance of Empirical Work on Brand
Name Sharing
Because brand name sharing has been a feature of commercial life for
centuries, the challenges posed by recent developments in trademark
infringement and dilution law, should have generated a substantial body of
research on patterns and trends in brand name sharing. However, virtually all
of the empirical work done on trademark infringement and dilution has focused
on litigation, rather than actual brand name uses in the marketplace. 50 Indeed,
the only report we have found of research on brand name sharing is a three anda-half page article published in 1950 by George Kingsley Zipf, a Professor of
Linguistics at Harvard University. 51
Zipf had previously undertaken a study of word use frequency in
spoken and written language. He had demonstrated that a very small number of
words account for most word uses, and he devised a formula to predict the
frequency distribution of those uses, which became known as “Zipf’s law.”
Under Zipf’s law, the second-most-frequently-used word has one-half the
number of uses of the most-frequently-used word; the third has one-third the
number of uses, and so on. Zipf sought out broader applications of this formula
of distribution of frequency, and also attempted to explain the phenomenon of
concentration by means of a psychological “Principal of Least Effort,”
according to which human beings follow well-known paths that lead them to
reuse familiar words. 52 One of the applications on which Zipf focused was
brand name uses. Zipf tallied the brand name uses in the 1947 edition of
Thomas’ Register of American Manufacturers, and found that the frequency
50

Empirical studies of trademark litigation include Barton Beebe, The Continuing
Debacle of U.S. Antidilution Law: Evidence from the First Year of Trademark Dilution
Revision Act Case Law, 24 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH L.J. 449 (2008);
Justin J. Gunnell, Goldilocks and the Three Federal Dilution Standards: An Empirical
Review, 17 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 101 (2008); Kenneth L. Port, Trademark Extortion:
The End of Trademark Law, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 585 (2008); Clarisa Long,
DILUTION, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 1029 (2006); and Robert C. Bird, The Impact of the
Moseley Decision on Trademark Dilution Law, May 17, 2006, http://ssrn.com/abstract
=903003.
51
George Kingsley Zipf, A Note on Brand Names and Related Economic Phenomena,
18 ECONOMETRICA 260 (1950). Other important work on rates of use of brand names,
though not on rates of brand name sharing by multiple businesses, includes a series of
articles by Monroe Friedman on the frequency of appearance of brand names in popular
American novels, American and British hit plays, and American newspapers. See
Monroe Friedman, The changing language of a consumer society: brand name usage in
popular American novels in the postwar era, 11 J. OF CONSUMER RESEARCH 927
(1985); Monroe Friedman, Brand-name use in news columns of American newspapers
since 1964, 63 JOURNALISM QUARTERLY 161 (1986); Monroe Friedman, Commercial
influences in popular literature: an empirical study of brand name usage in American
and British hit plays in the postwar era, 4 EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF THE ARTS 63 (1986).
52

See GEORGE KINGSLEY ZIPF, HUMAN BEHAVIOR
EFFORT (1949).
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distribution of brand names in that register roughly fit his formula.
Unfortunately, his article does not reveal what the most frequently used brand
names were, nor does it provide any other information about the brand name
uses that Zipf was tallying. Rather, the results of his research were conveyed in
a single sentence in his article that reported the frequency distribution of brand
names in the 1947 Thomas’ Register. 53
We think that there are many other questions that empirical work on
brand name sharing might help to answer, although in some cases they are very
difficult questions. Because the most radical form of protection against brand
name sharing – trademark dilution protection – is typically granted only to
famous brand names, a particularly interesting subset of these questions
concerns the sharing of such famous names, or more precisely, of brand names
of which a particular use has become famous. These questions include:
• As an historical matter, how common is it for brand names that have one
famous use to be shared by other users? Are some types of famous brand
names more susceptible to multiple uses than others? Answers to these
questions would help us to better understand the phenomenon of famous
brand name sharing, and would provide a baseline against which changes
can be measured.
• Have there been changes in the rates of sharing of famous brand names
over time? In particular, is there any evidence that the enactment of
dilution laws, combined with broader application of trademark
infringement law, has caused a reduction in the rate of sharing of famous
brand names? Answers to such questions would help us understand how
and why brand name sharing rates change, and whether major legislative
efforts to provide additional protection against brand name sharing have
been effective.
• Is there any evidence that suggests that changes in rates of sharing are
caused by changes in the popularity of the famous uses of those names?
An answer to this question would help us assess the validity of the
contention, often advanced by famous users of brand names, that other
users of that name have adopted it in an effort to benefit from the popularity
of the famous use.
• Are high rates of sharing of a famous brand name correlated with a shorter
life of the famous use of that brand name? Conversely, do famous uses of
brand names last longer if they are sparsely shared? Answers to these
questions would help us understand the gravity of the harm that brand name
sharing is claimed to do to famous uses of those names.
We cannot hope with this initial study to provide definitive answers to all of
these questions, but we can provide the first empirical study of brand sharing
and begin to answer some of them.
53

See Zipf, supra note xx, at 261 (“The x-number of different brand-names in the
United States (entire population in Thomas' Register) used by the same y-number of
firms is approximately inversely proportional to y2. [log y = -.4711 log x -1.890;
40.1587]”)
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B.

The Scope and Design of the Study

The empirical study traced the number of uses of 131 different brand
names in the white pages telephone books of three urban jurisdictions – the city
of Chicago, the New York City borough of Manhattan, and the city of
Philadelphia – in six different years: 1940, 1960, 1980, 1990, 2000, and 2010.
As detailed below, we had reason to believe that all of the 131 brand names had
one use that would qualify in some or all of those years as “famous to the
general consuming public of the United States,” thus satisfying the post-TDRA
requirement for fame, which we believe to be the most stringent fame
requirement ever incorporated into any state or federal law. Of those 131 brand
names, we identified 45 names as having a use that was proven to be
consistently famous over virtually the entire period of our study, since the use
appeared both in a national brand recognition study conducted in 1920 and
1921, and in a follow-up study conducted in 1997. In the next two sections, we
provide further detail about the brand names selected, and about the scope and
methodology of the study.
1. The Brand Names Chosen for the Study
Most of our brand names came from a study published in 1923, and a
follow-up study published in 1997. In 1920 and 1921, two New York
University professors, George B. Hotchkiss & Richard B. Franken, conducted a
study “of 100 representative commodities showing the names and brands that
are most familiar to the public.” 54 Hotchkiss and Franken surveyed 1024
college students – 512 men and 512 women. They provided their subjects with
a list of 100 product categories, such as automobiles, canned fruits, insurance,
and hosiery, and asked them to list the most prominent brands they associated
with each category. 55 The responses of those subjects provide a snapshot of
which brand names were best known in their product markets in the early
1920s. We excluded 34 of those 100 product categories for one of four reasons.
First, in 13 of the categories less than 10% of the subjects mentioned any one
brand name. In those cases, we decided, no brand name was likely famous
enough to merit study. Second, in another 13 cases, the product category itself
has become obsolete – consumers no longer buy corsets, or hair tonic, or collars
separate from shirts regularly enough that a leading brand in those categories
would likely be famous to the general public. Third, in seven cases, tracking
brand name uses posed particular difficulties. For example, the leading brand
of oil in the Hotchkiss study was “3 in 1,” featuring numbers rather than words.
Lastly, in one case, involving the category of linen, the leading “brand”
mentioned by the subjects was “Irish,” which was in reality not a brand but a
place of origin.

54

GEORGE B. HOTCHKISS & RICHARD B. FRANKEN, THE LEADERSHIP OF ADVERTISED
BRANDS (1923).
55
Id. 8-21.
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That left us with 66 product categories from the Hotchkiss and Franken
study. We chose to track the top brand in each of those categories. Because
some brands were leaders in more than one category – for example,
“Waterman” led in both ink and pens 56 – the Hotchkiss and Franken study
contributed 59 brand names.
In 1997, Professor Peter Golder published a follow-up study, tracking
the longevity of the Hotchkiss and Franken brands in all 100 categories (though
Golder also considered some categories to be obsolete). 57 Rather than
conducting another survey, Golder used market share information to identify
the most prominent brands in each category. In 20 of the 66 categories we
selected from the Hotchkiss and Franken study, the leading brand identified by
Golder was the same brand identified as most prominent by Hotchkiss and
Franken. In the other 46 categories, it was different. However, in five cases,
the new leading brand in the Golder study had been a leading brand in a
different category in the Hotchkiss study. 58 As a result, the Golder study added
41 new brand names to our list (as explained below), for a total of 100 brand
names from the Hotchkiss and Golder studies. 59
Although the brand ranked number one in the Hotchkiss study retained
its preeminence in only 20 categories included in the Golder study, the two
studies reveal a much greater degree of brand continuity if a somewhat broader
view is taken. This can be seen from two perspectives: first, by examining the
fate of the brands that led in 46 categories in Hotchkiss but failed to retain their
number one spot in Golder, and second, by examining the provenance of the
brands that became the new leaders in those 46 categories in Golder.
In the case of the Hotchkiss leaders that lost their top spot, 16 of them
appear in prominent, but slightly lower, positions in the Golder study – seven in
the number two spot, six at number three, and one each at numbers four, five,
and seven. Thus, in only 30 of the categories do the Hotchkiss brands
disappear completely in Golder. And even then, “disappearing completely”
likely carries too weighty a connotation. Six of the 30 categories feature brands
that continue to appear in the Golder study in other categories, often closely
related categories. Those brands are “Cross,” “Goodyear,” “Heinz,” and
“Waterman.” Among the brands in the remaining 24 categories, many, we
56

The other leaders in multiple categories included “Colgate,” which led in shaving
soap and toothpaste; “Goodyear,” which led in tires, raincoats and rubbers; and
“Heinz,” which led in baked beans, jelly or jam, and spaghetti.
57
Peter Golder, Historical Method in Marketing Research with New Evidence on LongTerm Market Share Stability, 37 J. MARKETING RES. 156 (2000).
58
Those brands, listed with the category they newly led in Golder and followed in
parentheses by the category they led in Hotchkiss, include “Campbell’s” in baked beans
(soup); “Colgate” in toothbrushes (toothpaste); “Cross” in pens (leather goods);
“Gillette” in shaving soap (razors); and “Hershey” in candies (chocolate).
59
In fact, the 41 names we tracked from Golder include one further subtraction and one
addition. On the one hand, we did not add the new leader in the category of hats in
Golder (Logo Athletic). On the other hand, Golder subdivided the category of pens to
include a new category of inexpensive pens, and we did add the leader in that new
category, “Bic.”
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suspect, would still be found famous despite their failure to appear in the
Golder study. These include Ivory and Palmolive soaps, Camel cigarettes,
Baker’s cocoa, Crane paper, and B.V.D. underwear. That leaves fewer than 20
brands of the original 66 that have simply ceased to exist.
In the case of the new brand leaders in the Golder study,10 of the 46
newly leading brands ranked number one in the Golder study had appeared in
the Hotchkiss study – seven times as the number two brand, twice as number
three, and once as number six. Thus in only 36 of the categories was Golder’s
number one brand completely new to that category. In three of those 36 cases,
the Golder number one brand, though absent from the Hotchkiss study in that
category, had appeared as the number one brand in a different category in the
Hotchkiss study. 60 Finally, of the 33 remaining brands, fourteen were already
in use in 1920, at the time of the Hotchkiss study, though they did not appear in
that study. 61 Thus only 19 of the 46 brands that were new leaders in the Golder
study commenced use after the Hotchkiss study. 62
To the 100 brands we found in the Hotchkiss and Golder studies, we
added 31 others, for a variety of reasons. First, we consulted a well-known
review of internationally famous trademarks by Interbrand, World’s Greatest
Brands, which rates the strength of hundreds of diverse brands. 63 It lists
60

Those brands, listed with the category they newly led in Golder and followed in
parentheses by the category they led in Hotchkiss, include “Colgate” in toothbrushes
(toothpaste); “Cross” in pens (leather goods); and “Gillette” in shaving soap (razors).
61
The date of first use data was gathered from trademark registrations filed with the
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.
62
Although it is sometimes difficult to obtain accurate information about exactly when
a particular use of a brand name commenced, it seems clear that some famous uses of
brand names in our study commenced after the first year of our study, 1940, and of
those, a few commenced after 1960, a year which we use heavily for comparisons with
the last year in our study, 2010. One might well ask whether inclusion of such brand
names in the study could lead to misleading results, depending on one’s assumptions in
interpreting study results. For example, if one were looking at the rates of independent
uses of these brand names as evidence of potential “free-riding” on the fame of the
famous uses, it would distort aggregate totals to include independent uses from a year
in which the famous use had not yet commenced. And if one were looking at rates of
independent uses for evidence of legal change that allowed famous users to reduce
independent uses, it would similarly distort aggregate totals to include independent uses
from a year in which the famous use had not yet commenced (and hence a year in
which the famous user could not have had any ability to take legal action to enforce its
trademark rights). Yet exclusion of new market leaders identified in the Golder study
could also be misleading, since declines in independent uses of brand names that no
longer had a famous use might be misinterpreted as the result of greater legal
protection, when in fact they had been replaced by independent uses of brand names
that were new market leaders. In the face of all of these possibilities, we decided that
we would include brand names that had more recently gained fame, but would note
separately the changes in their use rates. It turns out that these brand names had little
effect on aggregate totals. See, for example, footnote 101 below.
63
SEE WORLD’S GREATEST BRANDS, AN INTERNATIONAL REVIEW BY INTERBRAND

(1992).
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several older U.S. brands whose prominence extended from the 1920’s or
1930’s. Where we could confirm longevity of their fame in the Encyclopedia
of Consumer Brands, 64 we added the Interbrand trademarks to our list,
including such marks as Bacardi, Chanel, IBM, Mercedes-Benz, Rolex,
Tampax, and Zippo. Concerned that our list lacked enough of the sort of luxury
brand names most likely to be the object of independent use, we consulted
another source, Icons of the American Marketplace, 65 to see if we could
identify any long-lived brands that might have attracted more independent users
than Ex-Lax or Tampax. Once again, after checking brand histories, we were
able to add Cadillac and Harvard. Finally, we included the three iconic brands
found in the legislative history generated by the passage of the FTDA 66 and
used ubiquitously in examples by commentators: Buick, Bulova, and Schlitz. 67
In addition to identifying famous marks that have held their fame over
time, we searched the 1923 study for a number of additional marks that were
once famous, but no longer dominate the brand marketplace. We added three
marks that were famous in 1923, but have since lost their luster: Fatima
(cigarettes), Packard (cars), and Uneeda (crackers). 68 Here is the resulting list
of the 131 brand names the uses of which we traced:

64

JANICE JORGENSON (ED), ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CONSUMER BRANDS.
ICONS OF THE AMERICAN MARKETPLACE (2007) (listing the most valuable and
famous brands in the United States).
65

66

See H.R. Rep. No. 104-374, at 2-3 (1995), as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1029, 1029 (offering Schlitz Varnish, Buick Aspirin, Dupont Shoes, and Kodak
Pianos as examples).
67
See MCCARTHY, supra note xx, at 24:105 (“For example, the most popular
list of offending examples against which antidilution laws are directed is:
Dupont shoes, Buick aspirin, Schlitz Varnish, Kodak pianos and Bulova
gowns.”).
68
In the Hotchkiss and Franken study, “Fatima” was the second most
recognized brand for cigarettes, behind Camel see HOTCHKISS & FRANKEN,
supra note xx, at 145; “Packard” was the third most recognized brand name for
automobiles, behind Ford and Cadillac, see id. at 128; and “Uneeda,” taken by
itself, was the single most recognized brand for crackers, although Hotchkiss
and Franken aggregated it with other Nabisco brands and deemed Nabisco the
most recognized brand. See id. at 153.
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TABLE 1
The 131 Brand Names Included in the Study
Aiwa
Arbuckle’s
Yuban

Comet

Goodyear

Lipton

Rolex

Corvette

Green Giant

London Fog

Rolls-Royce

B. V. D.

Crane

Guinness

Louisville Slugger

Royal

Bacardi

Creamette

Hammermill

Mack

Sanka

Baker’s

Crest

Hanes

Marlboro

Schlitz

Baldwin

Crisco

Harley-Davidson

Mazda

Beech-Nut

Cross

Hart Schaffner & Marx

Mennen

Seiko
SherwinWilliams

Bic
Black
Decker

Del Monte

Harvard

Mercedes-Benz

Singer

Dial

Heinz

Metropolitan

Borden

Diamond

Hershey

Nabisco

Skoal
Smith and
Wesson

Breath-Savers

Dole

Holeproof

Nestle

Smucker’s

Budweiser

Douglas

Huffy

Nike

Steinway

Buick

Dove

Huyler’s

O’Doul’s

Stetson

Bulova

Dr. Pepper

IBM

Old Dutch

Sunkist

Cadillac

Eagle

Indian

Oneida

Tampax

Camel

Elgin

Iver Johnson

Oreo

Tide

and

Campbell’s

Eveready

Ivory

Packard

Tiffany

Carnation

Ex-Lax

Jack Daniels

Palmolive

Totes

Carter's

Fatima

Jell-O

Perrier

Uneeda

Chanel

Fels Naptha

Jif

Pontiac

Victor

Clabber Girl

Folger’s

Johnson & Johnson

Postum

Waterman

Clorox

Ford

Kellogg’s

Prophylactic

Welch’s

Coach

Kodak

Prudential

Winchester

Coca-Cola

Freightliner
General
Electric

L’Eggs

Remington

Windex

Colgate

Gillette

Levi Strauss

Rit

Wrigley

Colt

Gold Medal

Life-Savers

Rogers

Zales
Zippo

2.

Information Sources, Coding Rules, and Methodology
a.
Telephone Books as Sources of Brand Name Uses. The primary
information sources for our brand name sharing study were white pages
telephone books (which we will hereafter call simply “telephone books.”) We
chose telephone books for a number of reasons. Over the period of our study,
we assume that almost all businesses of any size had land line telephone
service. Telephone companies generally had a default policy of publishing the
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telephone number of every land line subscriber in their telephone books without
additional charge, because the availability of phone numbers encouraged use of
the telephone. We assume that very few businesses would have opted for an
unpublished number, because they wanted customers and potential customers to
be able to find them easily. Thus, telephone books should contain reasonably
comprehensive records of business names in the areas they cover.
Telephone books also provide snapshots of business name uses in a
particular year, thus enabling relatively close-grained studies of trends over
time. They do so because they are typically issued on an annual basis, and
because whenever a business ceases to exist or changes its name, the defunct
listing is removed in the next annual edition of the book. By comparison,
trademark registers reflect changes much more slowly, and are therefore
relatively poor information sources for time studies. Trademark registrations
on the federal trademark register, for example, must be first renewed between
five and six years after initial registration, and thereafter only once every ten
years; 69 before 1989, they only had to be renewed once every twenty years. 70
Thus, unless another business takes affirmative action to have a defunct
trademark removed from the register on grounds of abandonment, it can remain
on the federal register for a decade after it has become defunct, and before 1989
could have remained for two decades. Telephone books are also typically
issued for particular jurisdictions, which is advantageous because we can
compare uses over time in a particular area, and use other data about that area
to aid in analyzing results. 71
One limitation of telephone books is that they usually list telephone
numbers by business name, and not all brand names are business names. For
example, four of the brand names in the study – Crest, Comet, Ivory, and Tide
– are famously used on products made by The Proctor & Gamble Company, not
by Crest Inc., Comet Inc., Ivory Inc., or Tide, Inc. Some brand name uses are
therefore not represented in a telephone book. While we recognize that
telephone books are not complete records of brand name uses, the problem is
likely minor. Of the 131 brand names in the study, 110 of them, or about 84%,
appeared in the telephone books we studied as authorized uses, that is, in
connection with the companies and products for which they are famous. In
addition, some companies make it a practice to purchase an extra listing or a
cross-reference under their most common brand names, so that consumers can
more easily find them. Thus, for example, in the telephone books we looked at,
the Eastman Kodak Company always had a listing under “Kodak” as well as
“Eastman Kodak.” Some brand name uses are undoubtedly not represented in
telephone books, but as far as we know, there is no information source that
69

See 15 U.S.C. § 1058.
See 15 U.S.C § 1058 (1988).
71
We are aware that individuals and companies outside of the area covered by a
telephone book have been able to purchase listings in that book. However, from
observation we believe that to be a rare enough phenomenon not to significantly distort
most results, and in any event we believe that the opportunity to purchase out-of-area
listings has been constant, so that the results are not distorted by a change in policy.
70
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reliably lists all brand name uses in a jurisdiction on a year-to-year basis, so we
have to live with the limitations of available sources.
b. The Jurisdictions and Years Chosen. For this study, we decided to
look at telephone books from two cities, Chicago and Philadelphia, and from
the borough of Manhattan in New York City. All three have had very large
populations and enormous commercial activity over the time period covered by
the study. As far as we can tell, they also had stable geographical boundaries
over that time period. In addition, we believed that we could easily obtain
telephone books for these cities over our period of study.
We ended up looking at telephone books from all three jurisdictions for six
target years: 1940, 1960, 1980, 1990, 2000, and 2010. We chose 1940 as a
baseline year before the passage of the Lanham Act in 1946, and 1960 as a
baseline year before anti-dilution laws should have had much impact. We then
tracked uses once every decade beginning in 1980.
c. Rules Defining What Counts as a Brand Name Use. We established a
detailed set of rules to determine what would count as a use of a brand name.
The full set of these rules is available as an appendix online; we present the
most important rules here.
• Broad definition. Generally, any name that began with one of 131 brand
names in the study and that was recognizably the name of a business was
included. Thus, “Campbell Joseph Inc.,” “Campbell Manufacturing Co.,”
“Campbell Market,” and “Campbell & Brown” would all be counted as
uses of the brand name “Campbell.” We also included all instances in the
singular, plural, and possessive: “Campbell Market,” “Campbell’s Market,”
and Campbells Market” were all counted.
• No individual professional listings. One common type of listing in white
pages telephone books features the full name of an individual, followed by
the name of a profession or of goods or services in lower case letters, such
as “Campbell, Maria F. lawyer” or “Baldwin John G. metal prods.” In
earlier telephone books, these listings were numerous and varied; in more
recent books, they are less frequent, and usually limited to lawyers and
doctors. These listings were excluded from the study, on the ground that
they did not provide enough evidence that the individual’s name was being
used as a brand name.
• No alternate spellings or variants. We did not attempt to track alternate
spellings of brand names, such as “Douglass,” or “Forde,” or other names
that looked or sounded similar; only the exact brand names were included.
This may well result in some undercounting, but a search for all similar
variants would both require resources that we did not have, as well as
additional rules for determining similarity that would be very difficult to
formulate and apply consistently.
• First word uses only. We only searched for brand names when they were
listed as the first word of the company name in the telephone book. Thus,
for example, “Flowers by Campbell,” “Brown & Campbell,” and Joseph
Campbell & Sons” would not be included as uses of the brand name
“Campbell.” On the other hand, businesses often choose to be listed with
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their dominant brand name first – there may be listings for “Campbell
Flowers By” and “Campbell Joseph & Sons” – and in that case they would
be included.
Geographical and Semantic Compounds Excluded. We did not count the
occurrence of one of the names in our study as a brand name use when it
was immediately followed by another word and the two words together
formed a local place name. For example, three of the brand names in the
study are “Douglas,” “Ford” and “Rogers”; Chicago has neighborhoods
called “Douglas Park” and “Rogers Park,” and a shopping mall called
“Ford City.” Many businesses incorporate those complete place names in
their own names; for example, we came across “Douglas Park Dollar and
Food,” “Ford City Bowling Center,” and “Rogers Park Fine Wines and
Spirits.” Following an established rule of trademark law that “unitary
marks” are to be considered as a whole, 72 we decided that each of these
two-word place names would be experienced as a whole, and we therefore
did not count uses of them as uses of the brand names “Douglas,” “Ford,”
and “Rogers.”
Similarly, some brand names can be used as modifiers in semantic
compounds. In our experience, the brand name that was used in this way
most often was “Cross.” “Cross” is a family name, and the famous use
which placed it in our study is “Cross Pens,” named after Alonzo
Townsend Cross, the son of the company’s founder. However, as a
modifier, “cross” can also mean “across,” “between” or “covering the
whole of,” and we found many business named, for example, “Cross
Country Van Lines,” “Cross Cultural Consulting,” and “Cross Roads
Travel Service.” Following the same principle that composites are to be
taken together, we decided not to count these as uses of the brand name
“Cross.” On the same logic, we also did not count such phrases as “Dial A
Job,” “Dial A Mattress,” and “Dial a Prayer” as uses of “Dial.”
Branches and departments not counted as separate uses. Many telephone
books contain multiple telephone number listings for a given business
name, often because the business has multiple branches in different
locations in the city, or has a number of different departments under a
single main listing. We sometimes kept track of how many branches a
business had, but for purposes of this study we did not count branches or
departments as separate brand name uses. Thus, a business name could
only count as one use of a brand name in that telephone book, no matter
how many branches or departments it had. We did, however, count
different affiliated companies separately: for example, “General Electric
Credit Corp.” and “General Electric X-Ray Corp.” were counted as two
separate (authorized) brand name uses. Thus, it is possible for a single
telephone book to generate more than one authorized use.

See, e.g., Dena Corp. v. Belvedere Int’l Inc., 950 F.2d 1555, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1991);
TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 1213.05.
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d. Information About and Classification of Brand Name Uses. For each
brand name use found in a telephone book, a record was created. Each record
includes the full name of the use found (e.g. “Campbell Foundry Co.”); the
brand name of which it is a use (“Campbell”); the city and year of the telephone
book in which the use was found; and an indication of whether the use was
“Authorized,” “Independent,” or “Unclear.” 73
A brand name use is “Authorized” if it is a use made by the company that
made the name famous in the studies we consulted, or by an affliated or
successor company or a licensee. A use is also “Authorized” if it is probably a
nominative use, whether or not it is actually licensed. For example, “Corvette
Auto Repairs,” for a business specialized in repairing Chevrolet Corvettes,
would be considered “Authorized” whether or not the use is licensed by
General Motors. Any other use of the brand name as a business name is
“Independent” – unauthorized by the owner of the famous use of the name and
not a nominative use of that famous brand. Making judgments about whether a
use is authorized or independent when presented only with information
available in a telephone book may seem a difficult task. In practice, however,
we think that in most cases it is possible to make very good guesses. In part,
we were aided by the fact that telephone books contain business names, and
business names are often longer than the brand names of their products – for
example, the company responsible for making “Heinz” a famous brand name
for food products is the “H. J. Heinz Company,” not “Heinz Tailors.”
Telephone books also often contain short descriptions of the lines of business of
the companies listed, such as “Heinz Mfg Co aluminum extrusions.” True,
some companies have become quite diversified, and in a number of cases we
did additional research that identified that diversification. For example, the
company that made “Borden” famous for milk at one time produced a wide
variety of chemicals, and the company that produced “Colt” guns has
manufactured many other things as well. 74 Nevertheless, we think it unlikely
that a company such as the H.J. Heinz Co. ever owned a local tailor’s shop, dry
cleaners, or pharmacy, and thus in practice we are confident that our
classifications are in very large part accurate. In those cases where we
7373

Each record also contains a number of fields intended to aid the research process,
such as a field for noting later modifications of the record, and a field identifying the
record’s author.
74
It turned out also to be important to recognize that many of the companies that made
the brand names in our study famous also built buildings in the cities we studied. Thus,
there are or were General Electric, Postum, Rolls-Royce, Singer and Steinway buildings
in New York; Palmolive, Prudential, and Wrigley buildings in Chicago; and a Packard
building in Philadelphia. We treated all uses made in connection with those buildings as
authorized uses. More recently, a number of automobile companies have participated
in the revival of the theater district in Chicago, and so the Cadillac Palace Theatre and
the Ford Center for the Performing Arts are not independent uses, but are officially
sponsored by the Cadillac Division of General Motors and the Ford Motor Company,
respectively. On the other hand, the Pontiac Building in Chicago has never had any
connection with the Pontiac Division of General Motors, and so the few uses connected
with that building were treated as independent.
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remained unsure even after additional research, we marked the use “Unclear,”
and did not count it as either an “Authorized” use or an “Independent” one.
Between two and three percent of the uses landed in the “Unclear” category.
e. Methodology. The initial database entries were made by student
research assistants, who were instructed as to the rules for inclusion and
classification of brand name uses. Robert Brauneis then personally checked
every database entry against the original sources, and made several thousand
changes, including additions, deletions, and modifications. In some cases,
issues that we had not anticipated arose as the work was done, and we
formulated and distributed additional rules.
III. INDEPENDENT USES OF FAMOUS BRAND NAMES: AN OVERVIEW OF THE
STUDY RESULTS.
This Part of the article will summarize the results of the empirical
study. Because the study is concerned primarily with the sharing of brand
names, we will focus mainly on uses of the brand names that were independent
of the famous uses of those names. We will first consider totals across all
brand names, cities, and years, and then analyze the data by type of brand
name, by city, and by year.
A. Totals.
In total, in the six years and three cities covered by our study, we
identified 14,249 uses of the study’s 131 brand names. Of these, 1221 were
“authorized” uses, 12,779 were “independent” uses, and 249 were “unclear.”
Thus, each brand name had an average of 109 uses, of which about 9 were
authorized, 98 were independent, and two were unclear. 75 Those averages,
however, mask a very wide variation between brand names. Although each
brand name generated on average 98 independent uses, the median number of
independent uses per brand name was only 9; 33 of the 131 brand names
generated zero independent uses, 59 of the brand names less than 5 uses, and 71
of the brand names less than 18, or less than one per telephone book. 76 Only 25
brand names generated more than the average number of 98 independent uses.
The brand name “Royal” accounted for the most independent uses, 2086 or
16.32% of the total; second came “Metropolitan,” with 1583 uses, 12.39% of
the total. Rounding out the top five were “Diamond,” 1170 uses and 9.16%;
“Eagle,” 1069 uses and 8.37%; and “Baker,” 674 uses and 5.27%. 77 These top
five together account for 51.51% of all independent uses.
This may seem like an extraordinary concentration of uses in a very
few brand names, but concentration on that order is not unusual. Indeed, in the
study undertaken by George Kingsley Zipf, discussed above, 78 the distribution
75

[from spreadsheet Author Ct + Cell Check]
[from spreadsheet CountsTotalRankByCity rows 135-139]
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[from spreadsheet CountsTotalRankByCity]
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See supra n. xx.
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of brand name uses was concentrated even more tightly in the most popular
names, roughly following what has become known as “Zipf’s Law.” The
distribution of frequency of use among brand names in our sample does not
quite fit Zipf’s Law, because the curve is flatter – for example, the number of
uses of the second-most-prevalent brand name is 76% of the number of uses of
the most-prevalent name, and the number of uses of the third-most-prevalent
brand name is 74% of the number of uses of the second-most-prevalent name.
However, the distribution still shows a great deal of concentration, and the fact
that the curve is flatter could just mean that the sample does not contain the
most frequently used brand names in the United States, which is quite likely. 79
B. Types of Brand Names.
Brand names can be classified in numerous ways. When studying
words, linguists often consider four different components: phonology,
orthography, morphology, and semantics. 80 With respect to brand names, one
could consider how variations of each of these components correlated with rates
of sharing. We will not consider here matters of phonology – of how brand
names sound – or of orthography – of how brand names are spelled. We will,
however, consider some aspects of morphology – or of how brand names are
formed – and of semantics – of what brand names mean. Specifically, we will
consider rates of sharing of three different groups of brand names: (1) single
lexical words, that is to say, words that have a meaning defined in
dictionaries; 81 (2) family names – names that occurred in the telephone books
we studied as family names of individuals; and (3) words that fit into neither of
the first two categories, because they are acronyms or compound, derived,
coined, or foreign words.
1. Lexical Words. Twenty-five of the 131 brand names in the study,
or 19% of those names, are lexical words. Though they account for a roughly
proportionate share of authorized uses (20.29%), they account for 68.90% of
the independent uses. 82
The top five brand names – Royal, Metropolitan,
Eagle, Diamond, Baker, and Victor – are all lexical words. Although Royal,
Eagle and Diamond are found as family names, Royal and Eagle are quite
uncommon as family names, and Diamond is only moderately common. 83
79

For example, American, United, National, and Acme were not among the 131 brands
studied.
80
See Tina M. Lowrey, L.J. Shrum & Tony M. Dubitsky, The Relation Between BrandName Linguistic Characteristics and Brand-Name Memory, 32 J. OF ADVERTISING 7
(2003)
81
Linguists often use the term “generic word” as a synonym for “lexical word,” but we
have chosen to avoid the word “generic” in this context because of its prominence and
different meaning in trademark law.
82
[from spreadsheet CountsLexicalRankByCity]
83
We counted individual residential listings for all brand names in the 1960 and 2010
telephone books. We found 60 of the 131 brand names in the study as family names in
those individual residential listings. The total number of residential listings featuring
those family names in the 1960 books were 12458. “Campbell,” the most frequently
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Thus, Baker is the first name on the list that probably owes much of its
frequency to its use as a family name. 84
Only two lexical words,
“prophylactic” and “skoal,” generated no independent uses at all. One can only
guess that in the former case, the fact that “prophylactic” has become a
euphemism for “condom” is a great deterrent to its use as a brand name (and
likely played a role in the demise of the once-famous brand of toothbrush). In
the latter case, the relative obscurity of the imported term 85 and its use in
connection with chewing tobacco are probable factors. Twenty-two of the
other 23 lexical words generated at least the median number of nine
independent uses, and 14 of them generated more than the average number of
98 independent uses. It should be no surprise that a lexical word is more likely
to be adopted by multiple independent entities as a brand name, but these
figures give some sense of the magnitude of increased likelihood.
2. Family names. Sixty of the 131 brand names, or about 46%, were
found as family names in at least one telephone book in our study in 1960 or
2010. Some of them, such as Campbell, Carter, Baker, Ford and Rogers, were
quite common, and others, such as Chanel, Comet, Crest, Huyler, and Smucker,
were exceedingly uncommon. 86 This list would have been longer had we not
made a judgment call about brand names that consist of two or more personal
found family name, accounted for 1905 listings or 15.29% of the total, and the top five
names accounted for 60% of the total. “Diamond,” with 435 listings, accounted for
3.5% of the total; “Royal,” with 52 listings, accounted for 0.42% of the total; and
“Eagle,”with 37 listings, accounted for 0.30% of the total.
84
“Baker” was the third-most-frequently found name among the 60 family names we
found in the 1960 telephone books, with 1517 listings accounting for 12.18% of the
total.
85
Of all of the 25 lexical word brand names, “skoal” occurs least frequently in the
Corpus of Contemporary American English, appearing only 49 times. “Prophylactic” is
the third least-frequent, at 279 uses, with “carnation,” at 229 uses, in between. By
contrast “royal,” for example, occurs 12,629 times. See Corpus of Contemporary
American English, http://www.americancorpus.org. We checked to see whether there
was any correlation, either negative or positive, between the rate of sharing of a lexical
brand name and its frequency of use in English, as measured in the Corpus of
Contemporary English. It turns out the relationship is almost so weak as to be random:
a regression resulted in an R Square value of 0.0109 and a p-value of 0.6192.
86
Five other brand names in our study appear as (very rare) family names in the 2000
United States Census, although we did not find them in any of the telephone books we
searched: Crisco, Mennen, Oneida, Sanka, and Zippo. Three brand names were in fact
the family names of the company founders, but appear neither in the 2000 United States
Census nor in the telephone books we consulted: Bacardi, Bulova, and Nestlé.
Although “O’Doul” sounds like an Irish name, it in fact does not exist in Ireland, and
was apparently invented by the father of American baseball player Lefty O’Doul, who
changed his name from Doul. See http://everything2.com /title/Lefty+O%2527Doul.
As a result, there are exceedingly few people bearing the family name O’Doul, and it
does not appear in the 2000 United States Census. Other brand names were derived
from the family name(s) of the founder(s) through clipping – “Baron Bich” became
“Bic” – amending -- Charles William Post made “Postum” – or abbreviation –
“Bradley Voorhees & Day” became “B.V.D.”
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names strung together. Eleven of the brand names in our study fit that
description: Black and Decker, Harley-Davidson, Hart Schaffner & Marx, Iver
Johnson, Jack Daniels, Johnson & Johnson, Levi Strauss, Mercedes-Benz,
Rolls-Royce, Sherwin-Williams, and Smith and Wesson. We decided that in
four of those cases, the first name in the string was used often enough by itself
to identify the brand that it would be useful to track it separately. Those
include Harley, Levi, Mercedes, and Rolls. In the remaining cases, we
concluded, it was not useful to track any of the names by themselves, since
Smith and Wesson guns, for example, are never known as “Smiths,” nor are
Black and Decker flashlights known as “Blacks.”
There is a substantial overlap between family names and lexical words:
Eighteen brand names in the study fall within both the group of 25 that are
lexical words and the group of 60 that are family names. Therefore, it may be
useful to consider those both together with and separately from the family
names that are not lexical words. 87 Of the 12,925 independent uses of the
brand names in the study, 10,344, or 81%, were uses of names that we also
found as family names. 88 However, 7060 of those uses were of the 18 names
that were also lexical words, whereas only 3284 of those uses were of the 42
names that are not lexical words. As we mentioned above, while some of the
names that are lexical words probably have high rates of sharing due to their
use as family names – Baker, Victor, and Singer are prominent among these –
others, such as Royal, Eagle, and Crest, are less likely to own much of their
popularity to such use. Of the 42 brand names that are family names but not
lexical words, the top six collectively account for 60% of the 3284 uses of
names that fall under that description. Those names, which are all relatively
common family names, are Rogers, Campbell, Carter, Douglas, Mack, and
Baldwin. We will have more to say about the correlation between the rate of
family name use and the rate of brand name use in Part IV below.
3. Acronyms and Compound, Derived, Coined and Foreign Words.
Forty-two of the 131 brand names in the study are neither single lexical words
nor family names. Twelve are compound names, formed by juxtaposing two
lexical words, such as “Breath-Savers,” “General Electric,” “Gold Medal,”
“London Fog,” or “Old Dutch.” Twenty-six would probably qualify under
modern trademark doctrine as “coined” or “fanciful” words. Some of these are
quite recognizably formed from lexical words by processes of derivation,
blending, or clipping: thus “Windex” is a brand of window cleaner,
“Palmolive” a brand of soap, and “Ex-Lax” a brand of laxative. Others have
little perceptible relationship to any lexical word: “Bic,” “Kodak,” and “Oreo,”
for example, are unlikely to call any particular meaning to mind. Two brand
names, “B.V.D.” and “IBM,” are acronyms, and another two, “Aiwa” and
“Seiko,” are of foreign – in this case Japanese – derivation. 89
87

A family name that is also a lexical word would, for example, be unlikely to qualify
as “primarily merely a surname” under federal trademark law. See 15 U.S.C. §2(e)(4).
88
See spreadsheet [CountsBrandNamesSurnames]
89
Under the “doctrine of foreign equivalents” of U.S. trademark law, foreign terms
should be translated into English and then treated as those English terms would be. In
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Only four of these 42 brand names ever generated a substantial number
of independent uses. Those four were Eveready (97 uses), Uneeda (66 uses)
Gold Medal (49 uses), and Old Dutch (32 uses). 90 Of those, however, only
Gold Medal has remained relatively steady, with 10 independent uses in 1960
and 8 in 2010. Eveready dropped from 21 independent uses in 1960 to 6 in
2010; Uneeda from 27 independent uses in 1960 to 2 in 2010; and Old Dutch
from 12 in 1960 to one in 2010. 91
Of the other 38 brand names in those categories, 20 never generated a
single independent use, and in 2010, 34 of the 38 names had zero independent
uses and the other four only had one. It is clear, then, either that most coined
names are simply not attractive to would-be imitators, or that they enjoy broad
trademark protection, and those who have coined them take advantage of that
protection.
C. Cities. Of the 12,779 independent uses found in the study, 6687,
or 52%, were found in Manhattan; 4040 (32%) were found in Chicago, and
2052 (16%) were found in Philadelphia. 92 Thus, Manhattan generated by far
the largest number of independent uses, even though over the time period
covered by the study, the population of Chicago was much larger, and that of
Philadelphia began modestly larger and ended modestly smaller. In 1940,
Manhattan had a population of 1,889,924, whereas Chicago had a population of
3,396,808 and Philadelphia a population of 1,913,334; 93 by 2009, the estimated
population of Manhattan was 1,629,054, 94 while the estimated population of
Chicago in 2006 was 2,833,321, 95 and the 2006 estimated population of
Philadelphia was 1,448,394. 96 The greater number of independent uses per
capita in Manhattan probably reflects the fact that Manhattan is the business
center of a metropolitan area that is substantially larger than that of Chicago or
Philadelphia.
the case of “Seiko,” however, that seems unlikely to lead to a single definite meaning;
according to Seiko’s official company history, the word means “exquisite,” “minute,”
or “success,” see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Seiko, whereas as a girl’s name, it means
“sincere
child.”
See
http://babynamesworld.parentsconnect.com/meaning_of_Seiko.html.
90
See spreadsheet [CountsDerivedByYear]
91
Id.
92
See [spreadsheet CountsTotalAlphaByCity].
93
For the populations of Chicago and Philadelphia, see Campbell Gibson, Population of
the 100 Largest Cities and Other Urban Places in the Unites States: 1790 to 1990, U.S.
Bureau of the Census, Population Division Working Paper No. 27 (1998), available at
http://www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0027/twps0027.html; for
the population of Manhattan, which is New York County in the State of New York, see
http://www.census.gov/population/www/censusdata/cencounts/index.html.
94
See U.S. Census Bureau, State & County QuickFacts, New York County, New York,
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/36/36061.html.
95
See U.S. Census Bureau, State & County QuickFacts, Chicago (city), Illinois,
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/17/1714000.html.
96
See U.S. Census Bureau, State & County QuickFacts, Philadelphia (city),
Pennsylvania, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/42/4260000.html.
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D. Time. The most dramatic perspective on the independent use data
gathered in this study may be that of change over time. Across all three
jurisdictions, the number of independent uses increased between 1940 to 1960,
from 2293 to 3000, an increase of 31%. Thereafter, however, independent uses
steadily declined: 2456 in 1980; 2033 in 1990; 1617 in 2000; and 1380 in
2010. 97 Thus, between 1960 and 2010, independent uses declined by 54%.
Although there is some variation between the study’s three jurisdictions, they
follow the same basic trend. Chicago posted the largest percentage decline,
60%, from 938 to 374 uses. Philadelphia declined by 51%, for 483 uses to 235
uses, and Manhattan also declined by 51%, from 1579 uses to 771 uses. 98
These changes are graphically represented in Figure 1.
Figure 1
Independent Uses of 131 Brand Names in Three Jurisdictions,
1940-2010 99

These declines were spread broadly across the 131 brand names in the study.
Only 15 of the 131 names had a greater number of independent uses in 2010
than in 1960. Of those, eight were merely increases from zero uses to one use,
and the others all involved brand names with relatively low numbers of
independent uses. 100 The largest single gain was posted by the brand name
97

See [spreadsheet Timechart]
See [spreadsheet Timechart]
99
The numbers for 1950 are averages of those for 1940 and 1960, rather than being
based on empirical research; similarly, the numbers for 1970 are averages of the
numbers for 1960 and 1980. They were inserted to maintain a uniform time scale
across the figure.
100
See [spreadsheet CountsUnauthChange 1960-2010]
98
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“Tiffany,” which had six independent uses in 1960 and 19 in 2010, a gain of
13. 101 Meanwhile, 71 of the 131 brand names, which collectively accounted for
98.47% of the independent uses in 1960 and 93.62% of the independent uses in
2010, saw declines in such uses. 102 Forty-five of the 131 names had zero
independent uses in both 1960 and 2010; these accounted for all of the names
the number of uses of which remained the same. 103 Thus, the last half-century
saw a broad, steep decline in the number of independent uses of the famous
brand names represented in this study. We now turn to the task of examining
why this change occurred.
IV. NON-LEGAL CAUSES OF THE DECLINE IN INDEPENDENT USES OF BRAND
NAMES
Part I of this Article explained that over the past five or six decades,
trademark infringement protection has expanded and trademark dilution
protection has arisen, giving owners of trademark rights in brand names,
especially famous brand names, additional powers to prevent sharing of those
names. Part III of this Article showed, among other things, that independent
uses of the 131 brand names tracked in an empirical study have declined
sharply and broadly over that same time period. One might conclude that
increased trademark protection was entirely or largely responsible for the
decline. The truth, however, is likely to be more complicated. First, many
other factors may be at play, and it is important to consider what they might be,
and to see whether we can estimate their likely influence. Second, the effect of
legal change is likely to emerge incrementally in the market, so we must
consider how quickly changes in law could have an effect on brand name
sharing rates, and which brand name users could take advantage of those legal
changes. We will consider the role of trademark law in the next Part. This Part
will investigate three possible non-legal factors that could affect brand-name
sharing rates: 1) economic changes in the municipalities studied; 2) family
migration, which is made relevant by the many family names represented
among the 131 names in our study; and 3) the possible decline in popularity
over time of the brands studied. It will also briefly consider two other possible
non-legal factors--structural shifts in the popularity of business name types and
the cultural swing towards personalization.
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Id.
Id.
103
Id. As far as we can tell, seven of the 131 brand names in the study had famous uses
that commenced after 1960: Aiwa, Bic, Breath-Savers, Coach, L’Eggs, Nike, and
O’Douls. Of these, five had no independent uses in either 1960 or 2010. Coach had
four independent uses in 1960, and six in 2010; Nike had zero independent uses in
1960, and one in 2010. Thus, these brand names had very little effect on the aggregate
totals. For further discussion of such brand names, see n. 61 above.
102
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A. Economic Changes.
It is possible that the total number of businesses operating in the three
jurisdictions in the study declined between 1960 and 2010. If that were true
(assuming a stable distribution of brand names among those businesses), the
number of businesses that shared any one brand name would decrease. Most
obviously, the economies of the cities in question may have shrunk, resulting in
a decline in the number of businesses. Second, the average size of the
businesses in those cities may have increased and displaced multiple smaller
businesses. For example, many independent pharmacies may have been
replaced by branches of a single company that operates pharmacies under one
brand name, such as Walgreens, CVS, or Rite Aid. For the year 1960, the
project database contains 12 names of businesses that begin with one of the 131
brand names in the study and end with words like “Pharmacy,” “Pharmacists,”
“Druggist,” or “Drug Store”; by 2010, that number has dropped to six. 104 That
decline may well be attributable to consolidation, rather than economic
shrinkage or legal change. Another related possibility is that independently
branded businesses were replaced by franchises that are independently owned
but operated under a single brand name, such as Seven-Eleven, Burger King, or
Holiday Inn. 105
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See [spreadsheet BusinessTypes]
Many franchisors operate on a mixed basis, owning some of the locations that use
the brand name, and licensing the brand name to owners of other locations. For a report
on the top 200 franchisors and the percentage of locations to which each of them
licenses the brand name through a franchise agreement, see Franchise Times, Franchise
Times
2008
Top
200
Franchise
Systems,
http://www.franchisetimes.com/pdf/Franchise-Times-2008-Top-200.pdf.
105
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Given limitations on available economic data, 106 we decided to return
to the telephone books and use the number of overall business listings as a
proxy for both economic shrinkage and business consolidation. We estimated
the total number of brand name uses that appeared in the 1960 and 2010 white
pages telephone books in all three jurisdictions. If the total number of brand
name uses in the telephone books exhibited the same percentage decline as did
the independent uses of the 131 brand names in our study, then the decline of
independent uses would seem to be explained by some combination of
economic contraction, economic concentration, or franchising activity.
Unfortunately, it is not easy to count or accurately estimate the total
number of brand name uses in white pages telephone books. Counting is an
extremely labor-intensive process: the telephone books in the study have on
average about 1300 pages, and each page has upwards of 400 listings. We
simply did not have the resources to undertake an actual count. An accurate
estimate is also tricky. Most of the telephone books mix residential and
business listings in alphabetical order. The mix is very “lumpy” – pages listing
popular family names can contain almost entirely residential listings, pages
listing popular business names or acronyms can contain almost entirely
business listings, and one can find pages with a wide variety of residential to
106

Economic censuses have been conducted in the United States since 1810, but they
have two limitations that impede their usefulness for this project. First, before 1948,
regular economic censuses were limited for the most part to manufacturing industries,
and thus excluded economic activity in retail, wholesale, transportation,
communication, and other service industries. See William F. Micarelli, Evolution of the
United States Economic Censuses: The Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, 15
GOVERNMENT INFORMATION QUARTERLY 335, 358 (1998). In 1948, the Bureau of the
Census conducted the first census of the retail and wholesale trades, and of selected
service industries, but this census continued to exclude some service industries that are
particularly important to large cities, including the finance, insurance, and real estate
industries. Those industries were not added until 1992, when a large expansion of the
scope of the economic census enabled it to cover industries accounting for 98% of the
gross domestic product of the United States, expanded from about 75% of GDP in
1987. See id. at 372; Paul T. Zeisset, Disseminating Economic Census Data, 15
GOVERNMENT INFORMATION QUARTERLY 303, 314 (1998). Because the scope of the
economic census excluded a substantial percentage of economic activity until 1992, it is
difficult to use census data to make historical comparisons regarding businesses of all
types before that year.
Second, the basic unit of the economic census is the “establishment,” defined
as “a business or industrial unit at a single geographic location that produces or
distributes goods or services—for example, a factory, store, or hotel.” Shirin A. Ahmed,
Lawrence A. Blum & Mark E. Wallace, Conducting the Economic Census, 15
GOVERNMENT INFORMATION QUARTERLY 275, 280 (1998). The key here is the idea of
a “unit at a single geographic location”; many establishments may be owned by the
same company, or a company may only own a single establishment. The economic
census does not provide information about company or firm ownership of
establishments at the city level. Therefore, we cannot draw conclusions about
ownership patterns from census information.
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business ratios in between those two extremes. Nor is it easy to generate a
random sample, since each telephone book has a different number of pages and
the number of listings per page varies widely, since some listings take up more
space on the page than others.
We settled on counting the number of brand name uses on telephone
book pages that covered the alphabetical range from approximately Bac to Ban,
and then extrapolating from those results. This alphabetical range seemed not
to be uncharacteristically dominated by either business or residential listings –
it did not contain a business name like “American,” or a family name like
“Smith” – but we must admit that we lack a means for testing whether it is
closely representative of the entire book. This alphabetical range occupies as
many as ten pages in the 1960 Manhattan telephone book (which mixes
residential and business listings), but only a single page in the 2010 Chicago
and Philadelphia books (which have separate sections for residential and
business listings, although the business section still contains many individual
professional listings that we did not count as brand name uses).
The estimates so generated suggest that the total number of brand name
uses represented in the telephone books did indeed decline between 1960 and
2010, as shown in Table 1.
TABLE 1
Brand Name Uses in White Pages Telephone Books 107

Chicago
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n
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2010
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64242

2010
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of
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Names
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Percenta
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Change
Total
-7.57%
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e Change
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Names
-60.13%

1579

101463
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-14.02%

-51.17%

483

36581

267

-13.46%

-51.35%

1960
Estimat
ed
Total
69505

1960
Independ
ent Uses
of
Studied
Names
938

118012
42273

However, Table 1 also shows that independent uses of the brand
names in our study declined far more dramatically than brand names generally,
and that the relationship between the two types of decline varies widely. In
Philadelphia, independent uses of studied brand names declined at a bit less
than four times the rate of the total decline, whereas in Chicago the studied
107

For independent use data, see [spreadsheet TimeChart]; for estimated total brand
names in white pages telephone books, see [workbook Telephone Books listings
counts.xlsx]
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brand name uses declined at over seven times the rate of the total decline.
Thus, it seems quite clear that the declines we observed in independent uses of
the studied brand names are not just a function of overall declines, and that we
need to consider other factors.
B. Surname Uses and Family Migration.
As noted above, we found 60 of the 131 brand names in our study, or
about 46% of those names, in use as surnames in the residential listings of
Chicago, Manhattan, and Philadelphia. Uses of those names as brand names,
however, accounted for about 81% of the independent brand name uses in those
three cities in 1960. 108 Moreover, the rate of decline of surname brand uses
closely tracked the overall decline in independent uses – 53.73% versus 54.00%
-- so that the percentage of surname uses remained stable, rising less than one
half of one percent from 1960 to 2010. 109 Thus, changes in independent brand
name use rates might be tied to changes in the Chicago, Manhattan, and
Philadelphia populations of those bearing the surnames represented in the
study.
To provide a basis for testing this hypothesis, we counted the number
of residential listings for each of the 60 surnames in the 1960 and 2010
telephone books in each of the three cities. The aggregate results are displayed
in Table 2.
TABLE 2
Surname Listings Counts and Surname Brand Name Uses
in White Pages Telephone Books 110
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3290
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See [spreadsheet Surname Correl 3]
See id.
110
The figures for the Surname Brand Uses are from [spreadsheet Surname Correl 3];
the figures for surname listings are summarized on [spreadsheet Surname Correl 3], and
are contained in the database Brand Names table.
109
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TOTAL

12458

2440

9528

1129

-23.52%

-53.73%

If we examine the totals, aggregating the figures from all three cities, it
appears as though there is a reasonably strong correlation between the change
in the number of telephone listings of residents with one of the 60 studied
surnames and the change in number of uses of those surnames as independent
brand names. The telephone listings of residents of the three cities with one of
the 60 surnames dropped 23.52% from 1960 to 2010, while the number of
independent brand name uses of those surnames dropped 53.73%. Although it
would be unreasonable to think that the decrease in listings could account for
the entire decrease in independent brand name uses – each resident listed in the
phone book could not be responsible for two businesses – it could still account
for a large portion of the decrease. 111 The reality, however, is more complex.
The three cities experienced similar decreases in independent brand name uses
of the 60 surnames; they ranged from about 50% in Manhattan to about 59% in
Chicago, a difference of only 9%. The variation in decreases of surname
listings was, however, much greater. Manhattan lost only 5.08% of its 60surname listings, while Philadelphia lost 16.39%, over three times as much, and
Chicago lost a whopping 39.13%, almost eight times as much. 112 Since the
cities’ losses in both categories follow the same rank order, the data still
suggest the possibility of a linear, causal relationship between loss in
population and loss in brand name use, but a much smaller one. One would
111

The decrease in residential listings could represent a substantially larger drop in
population if the national averages for change in household size and change in
percentage of households that had wireline telephone numbers held for all three cities.
Between 1960 and 2008, the national average household size decreased from 3.29 to
2.62, while the percentage of households with telephone service increased from 74% to
95%. See Douglas Galbi, U.S. Historical Telephone Statistics, with economy-wide
employment
structure
data,
all-summary
spreadsheet,
http://galbithink.org/telcos/historical-telephone-stats.xls. On the other hand, by 2008,
20.2% of U.S. households had wireless-only telephone service. Id. If, as is most likely
the case, those wireless numbers are not listed in white pages telephone books, while
the wireline numbers largely are, then the percentage of households with listed numbers
has remained close to flat between 1960 and 2008. Thus, we would really only need to
correct for household size. Applying such a correction, the percentage decrease in
population of the 60 surnames in the study would be 39.79% rather than 23.52%. (We
do not know whether there has been a change in the percentage of wireline numbers
that are unlisted, and if so, how large that change is.)
112
By comparison, Manhattan’s total population in 2010 was 4.08% lower than its
population in 1960; Philadelphia’s was 27.72% lower; and Chicago’s was 19.64%
lower. See U.S. Census Bureau, Historical Census Statistics On Population Totals By
Race, 1790 to 1990, and By Hispanic Origin, 1970 to 1990, For Large Cities And Other
Urban
Places
In
The
United
States,
http://www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0076/twps0076.html;
U.S. Census Bureau, Population Estimates Incorporated Places and Minor Civil
Divisions, http://www.census.gov/popest/cities/SUB-EST2008.html.
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have to attribute the bulk of the decreases – 49% -- to other causes, and as for
the rest, it would take a loss of about 4% in residential surname listings to cause
a loss of one further percent of independent brand name uses of the
surnames. 113
Surname Ratio Comparisons and the Factor of Race. If we look at the
data in even more detail, we see further complications. The ratio of residential
listings to brand name uses varies widely between surnames. With many of the
surnames, this could be a function of the very small numbers of both resident
listings and brand name uses. However, seven of the surnames had at least 100
residential listings in each city in both 1960 and 2010, and so might possibly
exhibit somewhat more regularity. We looked at the residential listing to brand
name use ratio for each of those seven surnames: Baker, Campbell, Carter,
Douglas, Ford, Mack, and Rogers. In 1960, Manhattan had ratios ranging from
5.13 residential listings to one brand name use (Baker) to 11.06 residential
listings to one brand name use (Mack); Chicago’s range was from 6.02 to 1
(Douglas) to 28.36 to 1 (Carter); and Philadelphia’s range was from 8.78 to 1
(Baker) to 47.46 to 1 (Carter). 114 Those ratios all significantly increased by
2010, and there was some change in the relative place of surnames as well.
We suspect that one factor that can explain much of these disparities is
the possible lower rate of business formation by disadvantaged minority
residents. The only information currently available on the race of holders of
common surnames is from the United States Census for the year 2000. It
shows that there is a substantial variation in the percentages of various races
that hold the surnames in our study. For example, 82.08% of people with the
surname “Baker” reported that they were white – the highest percentage of any
of the seven surnames on which we focused. By contrast, only 60.51% of
those with the surname “Carter,” and 47.35% of those with the surname
“Mack,” reported that they were white, the two lowest percentages from among
the seven surnames. It is very unlikely to be coincidence, then, that in all three
cities, in both 1960 and 2010, “Baker” has a substantially lower ratio of
residential listings to brand name uses than “Carter” or “Mack.” In other
words, Bakers were both more likely to be white and more likely to be business
owners than Carters or Macks.
In some cases, the ranking of residential listing / brand name use ratios
parallels the ranking of surnames by the percentages of white holders of those
names almost exactly. One example is 1960 Manhattan data for the seven top
surnames, on which we ran regression analyses. A regression equation that
uses the number of residential listings as the sole independent variable and
number of brand name uses as the dependent variable produces an R Square of
.5977, and a p-value for the independent variable of .0415. That means,
roughly, that the variation in residential listings amounts for about 59% of the
variation in brand name uses, and there is only a four percent chance that the
two variables are unrelated. If we add the 2000 Census percentages of white
113

See the summary output of the regression on line 49 of spreadsheet Surname Correl
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See [spreadsheet Surname Correl T7 1960-2010]
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holders of each surname as a second variable, the R Square climbs to .9352,
accounting for 93% of the variation in brand name uses, and the p value for the
white holder percentages is a low .0103, but the p value for the residential
listing numbers climbs to .2957. In other words, the brand name uses are
actually correlated more tightly with the racial distribution of surname use then
they are with the numbers of residents in Manhattan. 115
The correlations are not quite as close with other years and cities, but it
is also likely that the racial distributions of the surnames in the study are not
nationally uniform or uniform across time, and so they may diverge
substantially from the 2000 Census figures that are available. In the absence of
more local information, we cannot come to more precise conclusions about the
influence of race, but we have good reason to suspect that it is a substantial
factor.
In sum, family migration has likely played some role in the decline of
rates of brand-name sharing of the 60 brand names in our study that are also
family names, and since uses of those brand names represent over 80% of all
uses in our study, they have an impact on overall figures as well. However,
given the wide difference between losses of the 60-surname population in the
three cities, and the much smaller difference in losses of uses of those names as
brand names, it appears that the family migration can only account for
somewhere between two and twelve percent of the brand-name losses, which
still leaves a large amount that must be attributed to other factors.
C. Variable Attractiveness of Brand Names Over Time
Advocates of broad protection for trademarks assert that second comers
are attracted to successful marks and wish to appropriate the luster of the mark
in order to increase business. 116 If this were true, then one would expect to see
115

For the regression results, see [spreadsheet Surname Correl T7 1960-2010 line 38]
Because some of the surnames are also used as given names, we also looked at
information about the historical incidence of baby names, gathered from social security
records. For example, in a sample of 666392 social security records between 1920 and
1929, there were no children named “Baker” or “Campbell,” but there were 43 boys
names “ Ford,” 50 named “Carter,” 310 named “Mack,” 941 named “Douglas,” and
1327 named “Rogers.” See Douglas Galbi, Most Popular Given Names, US 18011999, http://www.galbithink.org/names/us200.htm. (We chose the decade 1920-1929
because we figured that business owners in 1960 would have been given their first
names, on average, several decades earlier.) However, this variable did not do well as
an addition to the regression equation; it increased the R Square by less than two onehundredths of one percent, and had a p-value of .7837. See [spreadsheet Surname
Correl T7 1960-2010 line 38]. In other words, it seems that very few people were
naming businesses after their given names.
116
See e.g. Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Manufacturing Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316
U.S. 203 (1942). (“The protection of trade-marks is the law's recognition of the
psychological function of symbols. If it is true that we live by symbols, it is no less true
that we purchase goods by them. A trade-mark is a merchandising short-cut which
induces a purchaser to select what he wants, or what he has been led to believe he
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a correlation between the popularity of a brand and the number of subsequent
independent users of the brand name. In other words, CADILLAC, a more
successful brand prior to the Japanese auto invasion, should have been a less
attractive target for appropriation in the 2000’s. 117 One would expect to see a
decline in independent uses over a time period that correlated with the brand’s
decline in popularity. In fact, of the 53 total independent uses of CADILLAC
after 1950 (almost all in Manhattan), 21 occurred in 1950, 26 in 1960, and only
one occurred in 2005.
In several graphs below, we attempt to estimate the variation in
popularity of 37 of our 131 brands by tracking how often the brand name is
mentioned yearly in the New York Times, Wall Street Journal, and the
Washington Post at regular intervals from 1960-2005. 118 The list of brands
comes from an upcoming study of trademark dilution, measuring independent
uses of brand names in non-telephone databases, including newspapers, state
corporate/llc name databases, and trademark registers. For that study we
selected 37 of the 131 marks that seemed most entitled to protection from
trademark dilution. We dropped common surnames like Baker, Campbell,
wants. The owner of a mark exploits this human propensity by making every effort to
impregnate the atmosphere of the market with the drawing power of a congenial
symbol. Whatever the means employed, the aim is the same--to convey through the
mark, in the minds of potential customers, the desirability of the commodity upon
which it appears. Once this is attained, the trade-mark owner has something of value. If
another poaches upon the commercial magnetism of the symbol he has created, the
owner can obtain legal redress.”). The House report on proposed anti-dilution
legislation state that the new cause of action would “recognize[ ] the substantial
investment the owner has made in the mark and the commercial value and aura of the
mark itself, protecting both from those who would appropriate the mark for their own
gain.” See House Rep. No. 104-374 at 3 (1995). See also Anne LaLonde, Don't I
Know You From Somewhere? Protection In The United States Of Foreign Trademarks
That Are Well Known But Not Used There, 98 TRADEMARK REP. 1379, 1416 (2008)
(“Famous marks are particularly attractive to free riders . . . seeking to capitalize on the
financial investment of the mark owner. Copying a famous mark, the Federal Circuit
recognizes, gives free riders immediate recognition and substantially-reduced
advertising costs.”); Blake R. Bertagna, Poaching Profits: An Examination Of The
Ability Of A Trademark Owner To Recover An Infringer's Profits Under The Lanham
Act As Amended In 1999, 16 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 257, 292 (2008) (“[I]t is “famous
marks” that are the ideal target for cybersquatters and “free-riders” since “famous
marks. . . are more likely to be remembered and associated in the public mind” and are
thus more attractive as targets for would-be copyists.”), citing Recot Inc. v. Becton, 214
F.3d 1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
117
Cadillac sales plummeted in the last 25 years. As a percentage of the total US car
market, Cadillac sales constituted only 1.2% in 2008. See Ward’s Automotive
Yearbook 251 (2009). Percentage in prior years include: 2003 (1.3%), 1998 (2.2%),
1993 (2.4%), 1987 (3.7%), 1982 (4.3%), 1977 (4.0%), and 1972 (3.1%). See
respectively Ward’s Automotive Yearbook 242 (2004), 250 (1999), 204 (1994), 156
(1988), 70 (1983), 70 (1983), and 71 (1983).
118
See Historical Newspapers On-Line (Proquest) database at to
http://www.proquest.com/en-US/catalogs/databases/detail/pq-hist-news.shtml
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Carter, and Douglas, and omitted common word names like Royal,
Metropolitan, Eagle, and Diamond, to focus on those marks that we thought
courts would be most likely to protect from independent uses. 119 In other
words, we chose a list of marks that should have benefited most clearly from
the legal changes that we chronicle in Part I of this paper. The marks are:
BACARDI
BUDWEISER
BUICK
BULOVA
CADILLAC
CHANEL
CLOROX
COCA-COLA
CORVETTE
DR. PEPPER
EX-LAX
FATIMA
GREEN GIANT

GUINNESS
HARLEY-DAVIDSON
HARVARD
IBM
JACK DANIELS
JELL-O
KODAK
LOUISVILLE SLUGGER
MAZDA
MERCEDES-BENZ
OREO
PACKARD
PALMOLIVE

PERRIER
ROLEX
SANKA
SCHLITZ
SHERWIN-WILLIAMS
STEINWAY
ROLLS-ROYCE
TAMPAX
UNEEDA
WINDEX
ZIPPO

First, we should note that our sub-set of 37 marks followed the same
general decline in independent uses as the full set of 131 marks, although the
decline starts in 1980 instead of 1960.
Figure 2
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This decline in independent uses is driven strongly by three brands:
CADILLAC, PACKARD, and UNEEDA. In the graph below, we also include

119

Because of the “substantial exclusivity” factor, owners of marks like Baker,
Campbell, Carter, Douglas, Royal, Metropolitan, Eagle, and Diamond have had little
luck asserting rights under state or federal dilution statutes. See 4 J. THOMAS
MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 24.67 et seq.
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HARVARD, which shows little change, as the most important other mark
subject to substantial sharing during this period.
Figure 3
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In order to determine whether the 37 famous marks also suffered a
decline in attractiveness/popularity during the same 50-year period, we tracked
each mark for one-year periods, four times per decade, from 1960 to 2005 in
the New York Times, Wall Street Journal, and Washington Post, e.g. in 1960,
1963, 1965, 1968. We counted every time a brand name was mentioned as an
approximate measure of the extent to which the brand was in the public
consciousness in a particular year. Prominence in major newspapers is
obviously a very rough proxy for brand popularity, but we note that courts and
brand owners have long counted “consumer impressions” as a measure of brand
consciousness 120 and even as a way to measure secondary meaning (mark
strength) in trademark litigation. 121 Advertising theory in general discounts the
content of advertisements and takes more seriously the number of times
consumers encounter a brand name in any context. 122 In other words, the
number of times a brand is mentioned in a national newspaper (“newspaper
120

See Graeme Austin, Tolerating Confusion about Confusion: Trademark Policy and
Fair Use, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 157, 167 (2008) ([A]ccurate assessment of the strength of
the mark in any dispute would be difficult without some reference to consumer
impressions. Assessing the strength of a mark necessarily involves some kind of inquiry
into how consumers respond to the messages about the trademark that its proprietor has
conveyed, mostly through branding and promotion. Similarly, a firm achieves sufficient
“fame” for the purposes of dilution doctrine when the trademark has sufficiently
penetrated consumers' consciousness. Proxies are sometimes used in the course of this
inquiry: courts might focus on how long the mark has been used in a particular
marketing sector, or how many promotion and advertising dollars have been spent on
it.”)
121
See J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 2 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 15:50 (4th ed. 2010)
122
Kitch & Perlman case book.
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hits”) may provide fairly relevant information about brand/consumer
associations and therefore the attractiveness of the brand to appropriators.
We counted a large number of newspaper hits for the 37 marks,
peaking with 42,582 hits in 1970 and 43,758 hits in 1985. In raw numbers,
there is a very significant decline, down to 8078 hits in the year 2005, with
barely more than 10,000 hits in 2000 and 1995, but these figures do not account
for change in the size of the newspapers from year to year, nor for the fact that
after a certain point Wall Street Journal (1992) and Washington Post (1993)
data are unavailable in the Historical Newspapers On-Line (Proquest) database.
So, after 1993, we only measure hits in the New York Times.
In order to account for changes in the contents of the newspaper
database--a problem because fewer pages scanned means less data and
presumably fewer hits--we used the five most common words in the English
language as a baseline for the years studied. We tracked the words “the,” “of,”
“a,” “in,” and “to” (together “most common words”) in the same way we
tracked the 37 brand names. If the newspaper database remained the same size,
the number of hits for these words should not have varied much from year to
year. Therefore, any change we saw in the number of common words should
have been the result of a change in the size of the database due to the variable
size of newspapers or due to the post-1992 absence of the Wall Street Journal
and post-1993 absence of the Washington Post. What we see, for example, is
that in 1990 the most common words were mentioned 1,937,000 times in the
three newspaper database, but in 1993, the number drops to 1,352,890 and then
to 583,000 in 1995. By comparing changes in the frequency of hits on the most
common words with the frequency of hits on our 37 brand names, we are able
to provide an accurate picture of real changes in the mentioning of the brands.
In other words, we charted a real decline in brand names only if their rate of
decline was greater than the rate of decline of the five most common words
over the same period of time.
Figure 4 below presents the number of brand name hits as a proportion
of the number of five-most-common-word hits. We list the real trend for our
37 marks as the line labeled, “strong brand.” We also chart hits on four of the
most common brand names from our entire list of 131 marks. The line labeled,
“common brand,” charts the frequency with which Diamond, Eagle,
Metropolitan, and Royal are mentioned in relation to the five most common
English words. Since those four marks were representative of those omitted,
we were curious to see if they behaved any differently from the more
exclusively controlled 37 famous brands.
Figure 4
Brand Names in Proportion to the Five Most Common Words
(Unadjusted)
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The graph seems to show the prominence of the brands rising from
1960, peaking from 1980-95 and then declining sharply to 2005. We grew to
doubt, however, whether the data told a reliable story about brand popularity
because the initial data used above included mentions of the brand names in
classified advertising. We decided that we should rerun the numbers without
the classified ads hits for several reasons. First, many of our most frequently
mentioned brands were associated with goods that could be resold, 123 and a
very high percentage of yearly “hits,” sometimes as much as 50%, came from
ads in the classified sections of the New York Times and Washington Post.
When a brand is mentioned in the classified ads, it does not make an impression
on a substantial number of consumers, as opposed to a large print ad or a story.
Second, an appearance in the classifieds may suggest a loss in brand luster. For
example, those seeking to sell their Cadillacs may be dissatisfied with them or
looking to finance the purchase of a new Honda. The appearance of some
brands in the classifieds may also be a measure of hard economic times. In
some years, IBM and Steinway are mentioned frequently in the classifieds as
sellers try to raise needed cash. Third, the Wall Street Journal does not have
nearly so many pages of classified “for sale” ads as the other two papers, so
when it drops out in 1993, the data becomes skewed. Fourth, and most
importantly, after the mid-1990’s the number of hits in classified ads plummets
to a tiny fraction of previous levels. In 1993, for example, there were 1,970
classifieds ads for Cadillacs, but only 69 in 2005. As people begin to sell goods
on-line instead of in newspapers, the loss of ads generates an artificial downtick in brand prominence if one includes classifieds in the hit count.
If one omits classified ads from the adjusted hit count below, the graph
changes looks quite different:
123

Including Buick, Bulova, Cadillac, IBM, Kodak, Mazda, Mercedes-Benz, Packard,
Rolex, Rolls-Royce, and Steinway.
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Figure 5
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The trend for both lines since 1960 is generally up, and significantly so. 124 In
other words, in proportion to the five most commonly used words, the 37
brands we tracked appeared more frequently in newspapers over the course of
the 50-year-period during which we saw a decline in independent use. Thus,
for example, if we imagine that a reader of a daily newspaper spent about the
same time reading the paper every day over that period, and therefore read
about the same number of words per newspaper issue, she would encounter
more mentions of the 37 brands in 2005 than in 1960.
Of course, if the daily newspaper reader read the paper cover-to-cover
every day over those 45 years, she would encounter fewer mentions in 2005
than in 1960. The raw number of mentions of the 37 brands decreased over the
50-year period, although not at nearly as high at rate as the total volume of text
in the newspapers, as measured by the samples of the five most commonly used
words. Yet, it is at least plausible that the average newspaper reader, during
her incomplete perusal of the daily paper, was exposed in 2005 to a number of
mentions of our 37 brands that equaled or exceeded the number to which she
was exposed in 1960. If that is the case, then we have found no support for the
theory that diminishing popularity drove the decline in brand sharing that we
documented in the first part of the article. In fact, the newspaper data may
provide some indirect support for the notion that increased protection for
trademarks after 1960 drove the decline in brand sharing. The same increased
protection may have given brand owners the confidence to advertise more
extensively and promote their products to the public. The proportional increase

124

[I’ll have a stats footnote to drop here later]
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in brand name mentions may be the result of investment spurred by an ever
more friendly legal environment for owners of famous marks.
Finally, we wanted to ask one more question about CADILLAC, an
important mark that saw a sharp decline in the number of independent uses
from 1960-2010. We wondered whether GM might have propped up the mark
through advertising to counter worries about dropping popularity as foreign
cars begin to dominate the market. In other words, we wondered what would
happen to CADILLAC hits if we omitted both commercial print and classified
ads.
Figure 6
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We feel strongly that it is proper to include commercial ads paid for by the
brand owner in the newspaper hit count statistics. After all a consumer
impression is made by a large print advertisement as well as by an unsolicited
story. It would seem odd to measure brand prominence and brand value
without counting the influence of advertising on consumers. Nonetheless,
because we assumed that CADILLAC was a dying (or at least sickly) brand, we
were surprised to see that its proportional increase in mentions was not driven
by its own advertising expenditures. It also appears more frequently over time
in regular news stories.
D. Structural Changes in the Popularity of Business Name Types.
Because we chose to focus mostly on brand names that have been in
use for a century or more, many of our brand names reflect naming patterns that
were prevalent long ago, but may no longer be prevalent. In an era when
personal savings often provided the start-up capital for a business and family
members provided labor, it was quite natural to use the family name as the
name of the business. When start-up capital for a business is provided by
outside investors who may not want to tie the identity of the business too
closely to the founder, and when family members no longer dominate the
business’s labor force, the business may be less likely to take on a family name.
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Thus, for example, a study of the top 100 global brands in 2005 showed that, of
the 70 brands that had originated before 1945, 40 of them were the family name
of the founder, whereas of the 30 brands that had originated after 1945, only 3
were the family name of the founder. 125 If the same trend were reflected in the
telephone books we studied, much of the decline in brand name sharing rates
that we have observed might be the result of shifts from family names to other
names rather than overall declines in sharing rates, and perhaps there are other
brand names we have not included that have become popular more recently.
One might imagine, for example, the emergence of brand names related to jets,
rockets and atoms in the post-World War II era, or brand names related to
ecology and “greenness” in the post-Earth Day era. We suspect that the trend
away from family names is less pronounced among the small businesses that
dominate white pages telephone listings. To understand whether this is true,
however, we would have to count uses of a much larger number of brand
names, which is a very labor-intensive project, and therefore cannot be pursued
within the scope of this Article. This factor, then, remains a topic for further
research.
E. Personalization and the Flattening of Name Popularity.
Douglas Galbi has documented a significant trend towards less
concentrated distribution of personal given names over the last two centuries,
after many centuries of essentially unchanged distribution. 126 For example,
21.5% of the males born in 1800 in England and Wales were given the name
John, making it the most popular name in that year; in that year, the top 10
given names for males accounted for 84.7% of the boys born in that year. 127
Samples of given names over the previous 500 years showed very similar
concentrations. Yet since 1800, the percentages of the population given the
most popular and the ten most popular names have both declined steadily, and
by 1994, the most popular given name for males, James, was given to only
4.2% of the boys born in that year, and the top 10 names accounted for only
28.4% of the males born in that year. 128 Galbi describes this phenomenon in
terms of an increased preference for personalization, and a decline of shared
symbolic experience. Since the choice of a given name was unfettered by legal
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constraints throughout this period, the reduced concentration of names cannot
be explained as a function of legal change, but must stem from cultural factors.
Cultural forces at work in realigning the distribution of given names
could also manifest themselves in business naming patterns. In that case,
assuming that the stock of business names could itself be increased, as it can by
coining previously nonexistent words, rates of brand name sharing might
decrease across the board quite independently of legal influences. Indeed, the
new legal rules that limit brand name sharing might not have been adopted if
judges and legislators were not culturally comfortable with naming diversity
and the phenomenon of newly coined names.
As we will detail in Part VII below, in our sample of 131 brand names,
the distribution of brand names has actually become more concentrated.
Although sharing rates for those names have declined broadly, they have
declined less significantly for the names that started out with higher rates of
sharing. Thus our sample, over the time period we studied, does not exhibit the
decreased concentration that Galbi observes. A more comprehensive study of
business naming concentration would require data about the total number of
business names in use by businesses in a jurisdiction over time, and that is
beyond the scope of this study.
VII. ANTI-DILUTION AND INFRINGEMENT LAWS AS CAUSES OF THE DECLINE
IN INDEPENDENT USES OF FAMOUS BRAND NAMES.
We have noted that there has been a significant decline in the rate of
independent uses of the 131 famous brand names tracked in this study. We
have further noted that that decline does not seem to be entirely accounted for
by the decline in the total number of brand names listed in the telephone books
we studied, nor by the decline in residents who have as surnames the famous
brand names we have chosen to study. Thus, increased trademark law
protection seems to have a a role to play in the decline, but what sort of
correlation might provide evidence that legal changes have played a role? We
will consider two possibilities: correlation of declines in uses with the timing of
legal changes, and correlation of the percentage decline in independent uses of
each brand name with the initial number of independent uses. We will
conclude that the first approach is not promising, but that the second approach
is.
A.
Changes.

Correlating the Timing of Declines With the Dates of Legal

We know the precise dates that trademark dilution legislation became
effective. The Federal Trademark Dilution Act became effective on January
16, 1996. 129 The states of Illinois and New York first enacted anti-dilution
legislation in the mid-1950s: Illinois in 1953, 130 and New York in 1955. 131
129
130
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Pennsylvania first enacted anti-dilution legislation in 1984. 132 Shifts in judicial
approaches to trademark infringement are more difficult to pinpoint, but one
can try to identify key decisions; Gerard Magliocca, for example, argues that
Judge Henry Friendly’s opinion in the 1961 case of Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad
Elec. Corp. 133 was pivotal in resolving a dispute in the Second Circuit in favor
of broader infringement protection.
A search for sudden changes in brand name sharing rates immediately
after these dates, however, will end in disappointment. When averaged across
all three cities in the study, brand name sharing rates have dropped steadily for
the last fifty years, at rates of between fifteen and twenty percent each decade
between 1960 and 2010. 134 Although the rate of decline is slightly higher
between 1990 and 2000 – the decade that federal dilution litigation is passed –
there are no obvious sudden movements.
Yet the lack of sudden changes should not be taken as proof that
increased trademark protection has had little or no effect. Rather, it seems
likely that due to reluctance to apply new rules retroactively and the persistence
of established independent uses, legislation and shifts in judicial attitude will
only have a gradual effect on brand-name sharing rates. As for legislation,
some courts have explicitly ruled that the Federal Trademark Dilution Act
cannot be applied to trademark uses that began before its effective date. 135
Others have decided that injunctive relief may be available against such uses,
but like all injunctive relief, “subject to the principles of equity,” which would
counsel against relief against uses that commenced a substantial time before
enactment of the statute. 136 Under either approach, relief under federal dilution
law is unlikely to be available against established uses.
Courts do not usually explicitly declare their own doctrinal shifts to be
prospective only, but they can and do use doctrines of laches and acquiescence
to limit the retroactive effect of expanded protection. The case of Polaroid
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Corp. v. Polarad Elec. Corp, 137 which Gerard Magliocca argues ushered in an
era of broader infringement protection, provides a good example. Although the
court recognized that infringement protection might be extended to more
distantly related goods, it held that plaintiff Polaroid Corporation’s claim was
barred by laches. The court rejected Polaroid’s argument that a laches bar
would only arise if Polaroid engaged in affirmative conduct sanctioning
Polarad’s use, and concluded that an 11-year delay in taking legal action was
sufficient, so long as Polarad was not making directly competing goods, but
merely related goods. The decision thus expands the definition of related
goods, but limits significantly the retroactive effect of the expansion.
If both legislation and judicial decisions have limited retroactive effect,
then a key factor in the timing of the effect of legal changes is the rate of
turnover of brand name uses: how frequently do older uses cease as businesses
are dissolved, and how frequently do new uses arise as new businesses are
created? Because our database includes a field containing each full business
name, we were able to analyze rates of turnover of brand name uses. 138 Table
3 summarizes rates of turnover of brand name uses in all three cities in the
study.

TABLE 3
Rates of Turnover of Independent Brand Name Uses in Chicago, Manhattan,
and Philadelphia, 1940-2010

All 131
Brand
Names in
the Study
1940 to 1960
1960 and before to 1980
1980 and before to 1990
137

73.15%
66.78%
59.95%

Consistently
Famous
Names with
between 11
and 20
initial uses
64.83%
67.35%
64.16%
58.29%
57.33%
66.72%

Top 8
Consistently
Consistently
Famous
Famous
Names (in
Names (in
Hotchkiss
and Golder) initial uses)
66.17%
67.21%
59.96%

287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1961).
This required a great deal of proofreading and editing to ensure that the
representations of a business name remained identical in different years. For example,
we had to account for differing abbreviations, such as “Co” and “Corp” for
“Corporation,” or “Eng” and “Engrg” for “Engineering,” and for the presence and
absence of “Inc” (a business might be listed as “Crest Roofing Co” in one year, and
“Crest Roofing Co Inc” in another).
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1990 and before to 2000
2000 and before to 2010

50.46%
38.31%

48.64%
34.00%

48.01%
33.23%

51.39%
36.61%

The figure in each box represents the percentage of independent brand name
uses that were found in the ending year of the period listed in the left-hand
column, but not in the beginning year or in a previous period. Thus, for
example, taking the far upper left-hand data cell, for all 131 brand names that
we covered in the study, 73.15% of the brand name uses that appeared in the
1960 telephone books had not appeared in the 1940 telephone books. It is not
surprising that the highest turnover rate is found between 1940 and 1960, for as
the reader will recall, the total number of independent uses of the 131 brand
names increased substantially during this period – from 2293 to 3000, an
increase of 31% (though the turnover rate is still substantially higher than that
increase). Turnover rates for all 131 brand names then decrease for all
subsequent periods. The first two periods, of course, are twice as long as the
last three. By 2010, only 38.31% of independent uses of the 131 brand names
did not appear in 2000 or before. These turnover rates suggest that the effects
of prospective legal changes would be delayed, but certainly not indefinitely: a
prospective ban introduced in 2000 would have affected 38.31% of independent
brand name uses by 2010. The turnover rates do suggest, however, that
prospective legal changes will not result in immediate declines and make it
more difficult to trace a specific portion of the decline in brand-name sharing to
legal changes.
The second, third and fourth columns in Table 3 calculate turnover
rates for specific subsets of the 131 brand names. The second column considers
turnover rates for the 45 brand names that were leaders in their product areas in
both the Hotchkiss and Golder studies, and therefore by one measure can be
considered consistently famous. During all periods other than 1960 to 1980
these rates are somewhat lower. One conceivable explanation for the lower
rates is that infringement and dilution protection of these brand names is
hindering the appearance of new independent uses; but the rates are not
dramatically lower, and indicate that many new uses of these names appeared
as well. We will discuss the third and fourth columns of Figure 8 below.
B. Correlating Percentage Declines with Initial Numbers of Independent Uses.
Our second attempt to assess the impact of legal changes on brandname sharing rates takes advantage of the prominence of third-party use of a
brand name as a factor in assessing both infringement and dilution liability. As
we discussed above in Part I, consideration of that factor is mandated by the
Trademark Dilution Reform Act, which directs courts to consider “[t]he extent
to which the owner of the famous mark is engaged in substantially exclusive
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use of the mark;” 139 it is also an important factor in state dilution law, and in
state and federal infringement law.
Because of the weight accorded the factor of “substantially exclusive
use,” it is almost certain that many of the brand names we studied, although
“famous” in the sense that they are widely recognized by the general
consuming public in the United States, would receive limited dilution
protection. Some, indeed, would almost certainly receive no dilution protection
at all. Although the TDRA treats the extent of third-party use as one factor to be
balanced with others, many courts and commentators have concluded that if
third-party use rises above a certain level, protection against dilution becomes
completely unavailable. 140 If we knew exactly which brand names courts
would refuse to protect on grounds of insufficiently exclusive use, we could use
the rate of decline of independent uses of those brand names as a baseline. 141
Against that baseline, we would compare the rate of decline of independent
uses of brand names that met the criterion of substantially exclusive use. If the
rate of decline of the independent uses of those qualifying brand names was
greater than the baseline rate, that would be evidence that the passage of
dilution laws had had an effect.
Unfortunately, we do not know exactly which brand names would be
denied protection due to third-party uses. No court has formulated a bright-line
rule about how many independent uses would result in the denial of protection,
and a simple count of uses would in any event not suffice, since uses by small,
local businesses would surely not count against exclusivity as much as highvolume uses on a national scale. 142 Moreover, trademark infringement analysis
also takes into account the extent of third-party uses in determining the scope of
protection, and many have argued that infringement protection has expanded
during the same period that dilution protection was introduced, particularly for
those marks that are famous enough to qualify for protection against dilution.143
Isolating the effect of new anti-dilution statutes is therefore difficult.
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protection was articulated by Anne Gundelfinger, testifying as the President of the
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Testimony of Anne Gundlefinger, President, International Trademark Association,
before House Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet and Intellectual Property,
Committee on the Judiciary, February 17, 2005, (109th Cong., 1st Sess) (“[W]here
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If, however, we limit our aspirations to determining if we can see some
impact of legal change in general, without attempting to separate out the effects
of anti-dilution statutes from those of increased infringement protection, it
should be possible to formulate a testable hypothesis that takes into account the
factor of third-party uses, even without knowing exactly the number and size of
such uses that courts would find precluded dilution protection. If increased
legal protection has caused a reduction in independent uses, then the
proportionate decline in independent uses should be greater with respect to
those brand names that had fewer independent uses to begin with.
With this hypothesis in mind, we attempted to compare rates of decline
of independent uses among brand names that started out with a higher number
of independent uses to rates of decline among brand names that started out with
a lower number of such uses. We focused in particular on those 45 brand
names that appeared in both the Hotchkiss and Golder studies, since the owners
of those continuously famous names would have been in a position to take
advantage of anti-dilution protection, though we also looked at changes in
independent use rates among all 131 brand names.
Of the 45 continuously famous brand names, 37 had at least one
independent use in 1960. 144 (Of the other eight consistently famous brand
names that had no independent uses in 1960, seven had no independent uses in
2010 either; the sole exception, Life-Savers, had one independent use.) 145 In
the aggregate, the 36 brand names had 1291 independent uses in 1960; in 2010,
they had 535 independent uses, a decrease of 58.56%. 146 The results of our
comparison of the 36 brand names are displayed in Figures 2 and 3.
Both
Figures arrange the brand names in order of the number of independent uses
that they had in 1960, starting with the highest number on the left.
FIGURE 7
Independent Uses of Consistently Famous Marks in Chicago, Manhattan, and
Philadelphia, 1960 & 2010 147

144

See [spreadsheet InHInG 1960-2010]
See id.
146
See id.
147
From spreadsheet InHInG 1960-2010
145

51

Figure 7 shows that, of all of the consistently famous brand names that
had at least one independent use in 1960, only one, Tiffany, actually
experienced an increase in independent uses, and only two, Lipton and Gold
Medal, had roughly equal numbers of independent uses in both years. All other
brand names experienced substantial decreases in independent uses.
It is difficult to visually compare rates of change in independent uses in
Figure 7, but Figure 8 shows these somewhat more clearly. Figure 8 displays
three lines. The blue line traces the percentage change in independent uses of
each brand name in the same order as Figure 7. It shows that the two brand
names with the highest number of independent uses in 1960 did indeed exhibit
lower-than-average rates of decline: independent uses of Metropolitan declined
by only about 38%, while independent uses of Eagle declined by about 49%.
From there on, the line becomes a bit more erratic, as rates of change of
individual brand names vary up and down, and that fluctuation increases as we
reach brand names with very few initial uses in 1960, with the result that one
fewer or greater use in 2010 can have a large percentage effect. The line leaves
the figure area when it reaches “Tiffany,” because that brand name experienced
a 217% increase in independent uses between 1960 and 2010, from 6 to 19.
Finally, the line is flat at a 100% decline for the last four brand names, because
those names had either one or two uses in 1960 and no uses in 2010.
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FIGURE 8
Percentage Changes in Rates of Independent Use of 36 Consistently Famous
Marks in Chicago, Manhattan, and Philadelphia, 1960-2010

The other two lines attempt to smooth out that individual variation.
The red line displays a five-name moving average; its position at each brand
name is the result of averaging the rate of decline of that brand name and the
two brand names to its left and to its right. That line demonstrates a small but
fairly steady increase in rates of decline through about 19 of the 36 brand name.
By the time we reach the twentieth brand name, Heinz, we are down to 13
independent uses in 1960, a very steep drop from the 312 independent uses in
1960 of Metropolitan. The five-name moving average line then starts to climb,
because a few of the brand names that had between six and ten independent
uses in 1960 declined significantly less, and in one case, the number of
independent uses actually increased. It then falls at the end due to the last four
drops from one or two uses to zero.
Finally, the green line displays the cumulative average percentage
change for all brand names to the left of each point on the line. It also reveals a
steady increase in percentage declines through about the nineteenth brand
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name, followed by a gradual decrease until the final increase for the last four
names.
This pattern of declines is consistent with our hypothesis that trademark
law will have a greater effect on sharing rates of those famous brand names that
began with a small enough number of independent uses that the owners could
claim to be engaged in “substantially exclusive use” of their trademarks. The
two brand names that began with over 200 independent uses experienced, on
average, declines of 43%; the top eight brands, all of which began with more
than 40 independent uses, experienced average declines of 63%; and those 15
brands that began with from 10 to 21 independent uses experienced average
declines of 73%. If we decided that the factor of “substantially exclusive use”
would moderately weigh against those brand names with more than 40
independent uses, whereas it would weigh substantially less against those brand
names with less than 22 independent uses, we would conclude that changes in
trademark protection account for at least 10% of the decline in independent
uses of brand names. One might argue that 22 independent uses are far too
many for a trademark owner to claim to be engaged in substantially exclusive
use. Recall, however, that most of the uses found in telephone books are uses
on a very small scale – single-location grocery stores, cleaning services, and the
like – the markets of which are confined to particular cities or even particular
neighborhoods of those cities. It is likely that a court could find that a
substantial number of such uses “have little or no visibility to the average
consumer,” 148 given that the “average consumer” in question must be
constructed from consumers spread across the entire country. 149
To obtain a different perspective on this data, we also ran a few
regressions. First, we looked at the 21 consistently famous brand names that
had at least a dozen independent uses in 1960, excluding those with a smaller
number of initial independent uses on the theory that the sample size of those
names was too small. We set the number of independent uses in 1960 as the
independent variable and the percentage decline of those uses from 1960 to
2010 as the dependent variable. The result was an R Square of 0.458583 and a
P-value of 0.00074, suggesting a very high probability that the initial number of
uses accounted for roughly 45% of the percentage decline. We then ran the
148
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same regression on the brand names that were not consistently famous – that
appeared in the 1921 Hotchkiss study but not in the 1997 Golder study.
Thirteen of those brand names had at least 12 independent uses. Once again
setting the number of initial uses as the independent variable and the percentage
decline as the dependent variable, we obtained an R Square of 0.073231 and a
P-value of 0.371191. Thus, there was a much weaker relationship between
number of initial uses and percentage decline among those brand names that
had lost their fame some time in between 1921 and 1997. This, we think, is
consistent with the hypothesis that legal change played some role in the
decrease in independent uses. If the once-famous use of a brand name lost wide
recognition or ceased altogether, it is less likely that any user would be in a
position to claim broad infringement protection or dilution protection, and
hence the initial number of independent uses would have little impact on the
rate of decline over time, which is what the second regression seems to show.
Only if a famous use was consistent would that user otherwise be in a position
to claim broad infringement or dilution protection, thus making the degree of
“substantial exclusive use” relevant to whether that protection could be
obtained. Our first regression seems to demonstrate that relevance.
Of course, it is possible that there are explanations of the higher
decreases among low-initial-independent-use brand names that have nothing to
do with the increase in infringement protection and the introduction of dilution
protection. Even if the decline in independent uses we document is driven by
changes in the legal landscape, the evidence of a legal effect is only moderately
strong, in part because the turnover rates for independent uses of consistently
famous brand names with 11 to 20 initial uses are not dramatically lower than
those for the eight consistently famous brand names with over 40 initial uses.
As Table 3 shows, the turnover rates of the brand names with a smaller number
of initial independent uses are actually higher during all periods but one. One
interpretation of this could be that legal protection does not deter independent
users from initial use, but does then eventually lead to discontinuance of some
of those uses, resulting in a higher turnover rate. We do not, however, have any
evidence that this is the correct interpretation.
It is worth mentioning that because third-party use is important in both
infringement and dilution analysis, law can work to magnify the effect of the
non-legal factors that are reducing brand-name sharing. In 1960, some brand
names may have been shared by too many users to support a claim by the most
famous of those users that it was engaging in “substantially exclusive use” of
the name. Yet by 1990 or 2000, non-legal factors may have reduced the rate of
sharing to a level at which the factor of substantially exclusive use would weigh
more heavily in favor of the famous user. For example, at the time that the
sportswear manufacturer Nike, Inc. first used the brand name “Nike” in 1973,
there was not just one other federal registration for that name; rather, there were
at least five. 150 In addition to Nike Hydraulics, there were registrations for
150
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NIKE adhesive tape dispensers, 151 for sandwiches, 152 for perfume, 153 and for a
club. 154 These uses, however, have all ceased, presumably for reasons
unrelated to trademark law, and that has left Nike, Inc. in a better position to
claim that it is engaged in substantially exclusive use of the brand name “Nike,”
and thus to use trademark infringement and dilution law to prevent further
sharing of that name.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although the sharing of brand names has been a feature of commercial
life since time immemorial, and has long been recognized and accommodated
by trademark law, scholars have paid little direct attention to brand-name
sharing as a phenomenon and never noticed changing rates of brand-name
sharing. This Article has attempted to provide an introduction to the study of
brand-name sharing, and to present the results of an initial empirical study of
the sharing of 131 brand names in three cities over a 70-year period. A major
finding is the dramatic decline in sharing rates of these 131 names between
1960 and 2010. This Article has considered several potential non-legal causes
of that decline, but also suggests that increased trademark infringement
protection, and newly introduced trademark dilution protection, may have been
responsible for a substantial portion of that decline. Further empirical work
will help us to understand more about a phenomenon that has been a common
feature of consumer experience, but now seems to be on the wane.

151

See U.S. Trademark Registration No. 622166.
See U.S. Trademark Registration No. 771978.
153
See U.S. Trademark Registration No. 775529.
154
See U.S. Trademark Registration No. 862551.
152

